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CHAPTER 1
Introduction to the Essays
This dissertation is a collection of three self-contained essays that evaluate the impacts of
three finance and schooling reforms in Pakistan and Thailand.
Improving access to finance and education are two building blocks in pursuit of eco-
nomic development, and more generally, in achieving a higher standard of living. The
association of financial expansion and economic growth has been well established in the
empirical literature (King and Levine 1993, Jayaratne and Strahan 1996, Rajan and Zin-
gales 1998, Levine and Zervos 1998, Bekaert et al. 2005). These studies have focused on
the importance of credit in facilitating business growth. Recently, a growing body of rig-
orous empirical research has revealed other channels, through which access to finance im-
proves the welfare of the poor. First, consumer credit that provides consumption smooth-
ing mechanisms has shown welfare-improving effects (Karlan and Zinman 2010, Fink
et al. 2014). In contrast, traditional microcredit that seeks to promote business growth
does not yield transformative effects for an average household (Banerjee et al., 2015c).
Second, access to savings products, especially with features that help people overcome be-
havioral biases, demonstrate large improvements in various outcomes, including business
investment, health and education expenditures, and consumption. Access to savings prod-
ucts is more promising to deliver transformative impacts than microcredit (Karlan et al.,
2014b). Third, although the research on micro-insurance is still in its infancy, current ev-
idence shows that providing index-based crop insurance encourages higher productivity
investments and behavior (Karlan et al. 2014a, Cole et al. 2017). Finally, digital payments
significantly improve the risk-sharing within networks of friends and relatives, and lead to
higher savings and consumption (Jack and Suri, 2014). The use of digital payments also
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reduces leakage and corruption in social protection programs (Muralidharan et al. 2016,
Banerjee et al. 2016).
Regarding education, the theoretical literature has long attributed economic growth to
education. Augmenting the Solow growth model by including human capital, Mankiw
et al. (1992) argue that education can increase human capital and lead to a higher equi-
librium level of output. Other authors focus on the nexus between education and tech-
nological innovation, arguing that education can increase the innovative capacity of the
economy, which facilitates technological innovation. In turn, the innovative technolo-
gies promote economic growth (Lucas 1988, Romer 1990). Furthermore, Nelson and
Phelps (1966) argue that education facilitates the diffusion of knowledge that is needed
to implement innovative technologies. A recent empirical literature has provided evi-
dence supporting these theories. Using a natural experiment and instrumental variable
technique, Duflo (2001) shows that an additional year of schooling increases earnings in
the labor market by 1.5 to 2.7 percent in Indonesia. In the context of India, Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995) show that the year of schooling is positively correlated with the adop-
tion of new agricultural technologies among rural households. Skinner and Staiger (2005)
examine the adoption of new technologies across U.S. states over the course of the twen-
tieth century. They find that education (measured by high-school enrollments) and social
networks were the only variables positively associated with the adoption of innovations.
Education is also argued to improve socioeconomic outcomes other than incomes, e.g.,
health (Strauss and Thomas 1995, Schultz 1997, Schultz 2002). Sen (2001) has regarded
education itself as an intrinsic good.
Policymakers also enthusiastically support financial inclusion and education. United
Nation has positioned financial inclusion as a prominent target in achieving eight out of
the seventeen “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)”.1 Moreover, the World Bank has
put forward an ambitious goal to reach universal financial access by 2020, i.e., globally
all adults are able to have access to a transaction account or electronic instrument to
store, send and receive money. Today, more than 55 countries have made commitments
to financial inclusion, and more than 60 have either launched or are developing a national
1The eight relevant SDGs are SDG-1, on eradicating poverty; SDG-2 on ending hunger, achieving
food security and promoting sustainable agriculture; SDG-3 on profiting health and well-being; SDG-5 on
achieving gender equality and economic empowerment of women; SDG-8 on promoting economic growth
and jobs; SDG-9 on supporting industry, innovation, and infrastructure; SDG-10 on reducing inequality;
and SDG-17 on strengthening the means of implementation.
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financial inclusion strategy (World Bank, 2018). As for education, low- and middle-
income countries have massively expanded their education systems and steadily increased
the government expenditure on education to around 4% of their GDP in the last two
decades.2 More recently, one of SDGs is set out to ensure inclusive and equitable quality
education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
Accompanying the expansion of these development policies, the fraction of the adult
population with an account in a financial institution has increased from 51 to 69 percent
since 2011 (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). The global number of out-of-school children
has decreased from 377 to 263 million since 2000 (UNESCO, 2018). On the other hand,
there are persistently a third of financial account owners, who do not make any use of
their accounts (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). Students’ learning quality has also stagnated.
Today, still more than 617 million children and adolescents are not achieving minimum
proficiency levels in reading and mathematics (UNESCO, 2017).
The crucial question, whether or not the development policies have contributed to
these changes or stagnation, often remains unanswered. Answering this question ad-
dresses the immediate need of the policymakers on deciding whether an intervention
achieves its intended outcomes, and accumulates knowledge about what works and what
does not. Furthermore, it assists in comparing the effectiveness of alternative policies, and
thus provides insight on what works better, a policy question that has received escalating
interest as the policymakers become increasingly focused on understanding how to gain
value for money (Gertler et al., 2016). Overall, it promotes accountability in resource al-
location across public policies (Khandker et al., 2010). However, program managers and
policymakers have long focused on measuring and reporting the inputs and immediate
outputs of a program, e.g., how much money is spent, how many textbooks are distributed
and how many people participate in a microcredit program (Gertler et al., 2016). As the
focus of project evaluation has shifted from measuring project inputs and outputs to mea-
suring outcomes in the last decade, the demand for evaluating policies’ impacts is on the
rise (World Bank, 2012).
An impact evaluation addresses these crucial needs. It assesses the causal effects of a
policy on the individuals’ well-beings. More formally, I formulate the causal effect with
2Data is extracted from World Bank’s World Development Indicators on June 5th 2020.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?end=2017&locations=XO&start=2000
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the help of the Rubin Causal Model (Rubin, 1974).3 The Rubin Causal Model assumes
that each individual can be in one of the two treatment states, i.e., treated or untreated
by a policy. Each state is associated with a potential outcome. The causal effect of a
policy for an individual is the difference between the two potential outcomes particular to
that individual. However, we cannot observe an individual being treated and untreated at
the same time. It is thus impossible to obtain the causal effect directly. Instead, we can
only infer the average causal effect by comparing a group of individuals that are treated to
those that are not. When the treated and untreated groups are different in characteristics
in addition to the treatment status, a naı¨ve comparison between them would yield a biased
estimate of the causal effect. An example is the study of the impacts of microcredit on
microentrepreneurial activities. The difference in business profits between borrowers and
non-borrowers is a biased estimate of the impact of microcredit on business profits. The
reason is that the differences in the characteristics between borrowers and non-borrowers
may also account for the difference in business profits. It is difficult to control for these
confounding factors, especially those that are unobservable to the researchers. For ex-
ample, a microcredit borrower might also have a higher entrepreneurial ability, which is
often unobservable and difficult to measure. A higher entrepreneurial ability could con-
tribute to higher profitability, regardless of microcredit (de Mel et al., 2008). To eliminate
the biases, the ideal approach is to use “Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs)”, which
randomly assign the treatments to the individuals (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
Using RCTs is the golden standard for drawing causal inference. However, most de-
velopment policies are implemented in non-experimental settings due to financial, ethical
or political concerns (Athey and Imbens, 2017). For example, it would be unethical to
prevent households from receiving remittances in order to study the causal effect of re-
mittances on consumption smoothing. Despite the lack of purposeful randomization, the
implementations of policies often create variations in treatment assignments. For exam-
ple, large-scale policies are often rolled out in phases, creating geographical and temporal
variations. Some policies target individuals with a measure of pre-determined character-
istics above a certain cutoff, providing opportunities to compare the individuals whose
measures are just above and below the cutoff. Some policies are implemented in a one-
3The Rubin Causal Model is a formal framework for causal inference, around which the modern research
on impact evaluation has been developed. Important references are Rubin (1974), Rubin (1977) and Holland
(1986). For a systematic review of the model, please refer to Imbens and Rubin (2010)
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size-fits-all manner, creating variation in treatment intensity among individuals. When
these variations are exogenous, i.e., not threatened by confounding factors, they consti-
tute natural experiments (for the discussion on natural experiments, see Meyer 1995 and
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000). Depending on the rules that govern the variations of
interest in natural experiments, researchers employ various econometric techniques to ex-
plore these exogenous variations and draw causal inference. These techniques are often
referred to as identification strategies or empirical strategies (Angrist and Krueger, 1999).
For example, difference-in-differences methods exploit the geographical and temporal
variations at the same time.4 Regression discontinuity designs explore the randomness of
treatment around the cutoff of the “assignment variable” (also referred to in the literature
as the “forcing variable” or the “running variable”).5 An instrumental variable induces ex-
ogenous change in the explanatory variable of interest, to which a corresponding change
of outcome is attributed (for a recent review, see Imbens 2014). Matching methods pair
each treated individual with untreated individual(s) with similar covariates (see Imbens
and Wooldridge 2009 for an overview). More recently, the research on the application of
machine learning in impact evaluation has been very active (for recent developments in
this literature, see Athey and Imbens 2017).
My dissertation consists of three essays that evaluate the impacts of three develop-
ment policies, which have been implemented in non-experimental settings. Using various
identification strategies tailored to the settings, I address the critical policy question of
whether or not a policy has achieved its intended outcomes on access to finance, edu-
cation and poverty reduction. The first essay evaluates the effects of a large state-led
microcredit program on households’ non-agricultural entrepreneur activities and welfare
in rural Thailand. The second essay investigates a reform on the bank branch expansion
policy in Pakistan and estimates its impacts on the rural population’s access to formal
finance and poverty reduction. Finally, the third essay evaluates the impacts of a school
funding reform on school infrastructures and education outcomes in Punjab Pakistan. In
4Difference-in-differences methods have been an important tool for empirical researchers since the early
1990s. The most prominent study using this technique is Card and Krueger (1994) on the effects of min-
imum wages on employment. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) review this technique in detail. The recent
development in difference-in-differences has focused on the construction of synthetic control (Abadie and
Gardeazabal 2003, Abadie et al. 2010, Abadie et al. 2015)
5This method was first introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) in their work in psychology,
and has become popular in economics literature since the early 2000s. Recent reviews on its applications
to empirical economics research include Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010).
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what follows, I provide a brief introduction to each of the three essays of this dissertation.
The Regressive Effects of a Rural Credit Program: Evidence from Thailand’s Vil-
lage Fund Program
In chapter 2, “The Regressive Effects of a Rural Credit Program: Evidence from Thai-
land’s Village Fund Program”, a joint work with Stefan Klonner, we study the effects of
Thailand’s Village Fund Program with particular focuses on non-agricultural entrepreneur-
ship, household welfare in the longer run, and heterogeneous program effects. Thailand’s
Village Fund is one of the most ambitious state-led microcredit intervention in the world
(Boonperm et al., 2012). Aiming at stimulating economic growth in rural Thailand, in
2001, the Government of Thailand started to distribute one million baht (approximately
USD 24,000 in 2001) to each of the 79,000 villages in Thailand, regardless of village
size. By the end of 2002, the government had spent around 2.4 percent of Thailand’s
GDP of that year to fund this program (Pungprawat, 2012). Meanwhile, 99 percent of the
targeted villages had set up the fund by 2002 (Pungprawat, 2012). By the end of 2004,
the active borrowers of the Village Fund added up to 11 percent of Thailand’s population
(Boonperm et al., 2012).
For the empirical identification of program effects, we exploit the variation in the
Fund’s intensity per village household, which is reciprocal to village size, within a difference-
in-differences approach using a household-year panel data set. This variation is argued to
be exogenous for two reasons. First, villages are administrative units whose sizes have
stayed relatively constant before and after the program. Second, the program forbids
lending to nonlocals. This identification strategy delivers marginal program effects eval-
uated at the program’s large average intensity of 10,000 baht (650 PPP US dollars) per
household, an amount roughly equals to the pre-intervention average of formal household
borrowings.
We find an immediate and substantial increase in access to credit along the entire in-
come distribution without crowding-out of other forms of credit. For the real economy,
we document, first, that the program increased business activity as measured by the share
of households operating a non-agricultural business by 20 percent. Second, there is sig-
nificant heterogeneity in program effects along the wealth distribution. While we find
no effect on business activity for initially poor households, initially wealthy households
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expand the number of businesses and employees by 21 percent. Additionally, the value of
their business assets increases by 73 percent.
Consistent with these heterogeneous effects on entrepreneurship, we find that welfare,
as measured by expenditures on high-frequency consumption items, increases by 10 per-
cent among initially wealthy households, while we find no such effect among the initially
poor. This heterogeneity persists over the ten years after the program’s inception. As a
result, the Village Fund sharpens village-level consumption inequality, as measured by
initially wealthy households’ share in aggregate consumption, by about half a percentage
point per year.
We argue that business expansion is likely to be the mechanism behind these het-
erogeneous welfare gains. In support of our argument, we find that wealthy households
accumulate business assets by adapting preexisting house and vehicle to business use,
rather than acquiring new assets. Precisely, we find that the Village Fund increases the
expenditure on house and vehicle repairs among the wealthy households. On the contrary,
the initially poor households do not achieve similar gains regarding business expansion,
even though they benefit from the Village Fund in terms of financial inclusion.
In contrast to the conventional argument, this essay shows that initial wealth com-
plements rather than substitutes the access to credit when it comes to business expansion.
This might explain why most microcredit interventions fail to bring welfare gains to ultra-
poor households, who are deprived of household assets. Therefore, to improve welfare
for the ultra-poor through fostering entrepreneurship, interventions, such as a graduation
program (Banerjee et al., 2015b), might be more effective than microcredit.
A Financial Inclusion Policy Gone Wrong: Pakistan’s Bank Branch Expansion Re-
form
In the last two decades, the number of microfinance institutions whose primary clientele
are relatively poor households has skyrocketed. This observation is in line with the belief
that traditional banks are not suitable for lending to these households. Accompanying
the expansion of microfinance institutions, the literature has witnessed a sharp increase in
the number of studies that evaluate the ability of microfinance institutions to cater to the
poor. However, these studies need to be supplemented with others that address the extent
to which other banking institutions can also serve the poor. The essay in chapter 3, “A
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Financial Inclusion Policy Gone Wrong: Pakistan’s Bank Branch Expansion Reform”,
serves this objective, evaluating whether expanding commercial bank branches to rural
areas improves rural households’ access to formal finance, and whether it helps reduce
poverty.
In 2004, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Pakistan’s central bank, implemented a
reform in its “Branch Expansion Policy” with an objective to enhance the outreach of the
banking services to the rural and underserved areas of the country. This reform mandated
the banks with a network size of no less than 100 branches to open 20% of their new
branches in “Rural and Underserved Areas (RUA)”, which were vaguely defined as “vil-
lages, small towns or unbanked tehsil headquarters”. This policy was expanded to include
all banks regardless of their network sizes effectively in 2007.
I draw on several sources for the data in this analysis, including the State Bank of Pak-
istan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, European Commission and the United States National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Using bank-branch-level geographical data, I track the
expansion of bank networks along the policy timeline. I establish the policy’s effect on
the networks’ rural population coverage using a simple trend break model. On an ag-
gregate level, I identify the policy’s effects on branch accessibility, agricultural credit
disbursement and poverty by estimating a difference-in-differences trend break model.
This model exploits the change in banks’ selection on less remote rural locations for their
RUA branches after the policy.
I find that the banks have complied with the policy by reserving 20% new branches for
RUA locations. However, the bulk of new RUA branches are in less remote locations, i.e.,
locations that are closer to district capitals and more likely to have other branches within
5 kilometers radius, than the RUA branches opened before the reform. As a result, the
policy failed to reach to unbanked rural areas. Precisely, the fraction of the country’s rural
population living within 5 kilometers radius of a bank branch (banked rural population)
stagnated at 57 percent. A counterfactual analysis reveals that the banked rural population
would have reached to 70 to 72 percent had the banks chosen locations with a higher
“Rural Market Potential (RMP)”, i.e., locations with a larger rural population per branch
or unbanked locations with a larger rural population.
Consistent with the actual branch-opening pattern, the aggregate level analysis shows
that the size of the RUA branch network has grown slower in districts with a larger rural
8
population share after the policy. In other words, the growth rate of RUA branch network
in a more rural district (e.g., “Lower Dir” whose rural population share is 97 percent)
was surpassed by the less rural one (e.g., “Karachi” whose rural population share is 7
percent) by 0.86 branches per million persons per year after the reform. This accounts
for an accumulative difference of 5.16 RUA branches per million persons between a more
and less rural district by 2012, a value that is 66% of the average RUA network size in
2000.
However, the number of borrowers and the amount of credit disbursed to agricultural
sector did not grow differently between a more and less rural district in the wake of the
reform. These results suggest that the policy has failed to expand credit disbursement to
the rural sector, consistent with the branch network’s stagnant rural population coverage.
Finally, poverty has also evolved in parallel between more and less rural districts along
the policy timeline, suggesting a lack of impact on poverty.
Taken together, I conclude that the rural expansion policy has failed to enhance the
banking sector’s rural outreach and reduce poverty. The reason is that the new branches
reserved by the 20 percent quota were opened in less remote rural locations where a
branch network has already existed. More unfortunately, the reform has sharpened the
geographical inequality in the number of RUA branches. My findings demonstrate the
need for more carefully designed government interventions for improving financial ac-
cess than Pakistan’s arguably naı¨ve bank branch expansion policy.
School Grants and Education Outcomes: The Impacts of the Non-Salary Budget
Reform in Punjab Pakistan
Regarding education, policymakers have become more and more interested in providing
decentralized grants to schools in the hope of improving education outcomes. The belief
is that decision-makers at the local level have a better understanding of the schools’ needs
than those at the national level. Therefore, they are in a better position to identify schools’
deficiencies and to use the resources more efficiently. However, evidence from rigorous
evaluations are still limited. In this connection, in chapter 4, “School Grants and Edu-
cation Outcomes: The Impacts of the Non-Salary Budget Reform in Punjab Pakistan”,
co-authored with Kafeel Sarwar, we investigate a decentralized school grant program in
Punjab Pakistan. We address two questions. First, does providing decentralized school
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grants have any impacts on human capital (measured by teacher’s attendance rate) and
school’s physical infrastructure? Second, does this decentralized grant improve the edu-
cation quantity and quality?
Public schools in Punjab Pakistan have suffered from underfunding of non-salary ex-
penditure. Prior to the reform, they received a fixed grant of Rs. 20,000 (approximately
200 USD in 2013) or 40,000 per annum, depending on the school level, for the non-salary
expenditures. However, this was highly insufficient even to cover the maintenance fee of
the basic infrastructures, which was estimated to be about Rs. 70,000. The underfunding
for the non-salary expenditure has persistently hindered public schools’ ability to attract
and retain students.
Against this backdrop, the Punjab government implemented the “Non-salary Budget
(NSB)” reforms in 2013, which altered the funding allocation rule from a fixed to need-
based rule. The need-based rule accounts for school level, student enrollment, furniture
deficiency and building condition. Under this need-based rule, the average annual non-
salary budget per school amounts to Rs. 220,000, which is about ten times the amount
received under the erstwhile fixed allocation rule. The reform has also devolved the finan-
cial decision-making to the school councils, which consist of parents and headteachers.
The NSB reform was rolled out in three phases to cover the whole province. In 2013,
nine districts were selected for phase one. In 2014, additional nine districts were added in
phase two. Since 2015, the NSB reform was extended to the whole Punjab province.
To identify the reform’s impacts, we use a difference-in-differences method, explor-
ing the reform’s staggered rollout schedule, which has created temporal and geographical
variations in policy treatment. This identification strategy delivers the average effects of
entering the NSB reform. We combine administrative data and independent household
surveys from various sources. We collect administrative data on schools’ financial ac-
counts, infrastructure conditions, teacher and student attendance rate, and standardized
test scores from the School and Education Department of Punjab and the Punjab Exami-
nation Commission. We measure children’s school enrollment rate and basic reading and
mathematical ability measures using two independent household surveys, namely “Multi-
ple Indicator Cluster Survey Punjab” and “Annual Status of Education Report Pakistan”.
We report four sets of results. First, regarding school’s financial account, the NSB
reform has significantly increased an average school’s annual income and expenditure by
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Rs. 180,000 and Rs. 135,000, respectively. Second, the reform has significantly improved
the conditions of the school infrastructures by 0.045 standard deviations. This effect is
driven by the improvements in the existing infrastructures, e.g., the fraction of functional
toilets, complete boundary wall and safe school building condition. In terms of human
capital input, we find that teacher’s attendance has increased slightly by 0.9 percentage
points, a value that is only 1% of the average at the baseline. Third, we do not find any
effect on education quantity as measured by student’s attendance rate and enrollment rate
among children of age 5 to 16. Finally, we do not find any impacts on students’ numeracy
and literacy test scores, or basic reading and mathematical ability scores.
We interpret the lack of effects on education outcomes as a result of insufficient ca-
pacity among the school council members. In fact, a report on the procurement in the
education sector of Punjab, I-SAPS (2014), has revealed that the majority of school coun-
cil members do not understand the procedure of school procurement. More importantly,
the school councils have limited power to hold the teachers accountable for delivering
quality education, as the teachers in public schools of Pakistan have political patronage.
Simply increasing the funding to schools does not change the lack of accountability rela-
tionship between the teachers and the school councils. Overall, our findings are consistent
with Mbiti et al. (2019) and Beasley and Huillery (2017), who show that the effectiveness
of decentralized school grants depends on the capacity of the local planners who are re-
sponsible for grant management.
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CHAPTER 2
The Regressive Effects of a Rural
Credit Program: Evidence from
Thailand’s Village Fund Program
*Joint work with Stefan Klonner
Abstract We study the impacts of an expansion of credit supply in the context of Thai-
land’s Village Fund Program on entrepreneurship and household welfare. We use exoge-
nous variation in the program’s intensity across villages of different sizes to identify the
effects of a credit supply expansion beyond the program’s mean intensity. While credit
reached out to poor and wealthy households alike, we find that credit deepening causes
an expansion in micro-entrepreneurship and business assets only among initially wealthy
households. Similarly, for household consumption, we find sustained increases in the
long run only among initially wealthy households, implying an increase in consumption
inequality, as measured by the initially wealthy households’ share in aggregate consump-
tion, of half percentage point per year. Our results challenge the view that universal access
to credit enhances equity, at least for supply expansions of the Village Fund’s scale.
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2.1 Introduction
Rural households in low-income countries have traditionally faced large impediments to
access to formal finance (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). High interest rates and credit con-
straints are commonly believed to impinge on both entrepreneurial activity and consump-
tion smoothing. In response, expanding access to institutional credit has become an im-
portant development goal with the potential to bring gains in efficiency as well as equity.
The expansion of access to institutional credit among rural populations has largely been
promoted by government banking and lending programs and, more recently, microfinance
institutions (Karlan and Morduch, 2010).
Lately, plenty of empirical evidence on the effects of microfinance on entrepreneur-
ship and welfare has accumulated. Banerjee et al. (2015c) summarize the following
stylized facts. First, microfinance has small but measurable positive effects on micro-
entrepreneurship. Second, there is great heterogeneity in these effects with respect to
certain baseline characteristics of households, in particular the presence of a business.
Third, given common practical limitations in the design of field experiments, there are
rarely measurable welfare gains. For large-scale government banking and lending pro-
grams, the evidence is more limited. Some prominent studies find a sizable positive effect
on welfare (Boonperm et al. 2013, Kaboski and Townsend 2012, Burgess and Pande 2005,
Cuong 2008), while the evidence for entrepreneurship is more mixed (Burgess and Pande
2003, Kaboski and Townsend 2012).
In this paper, we revisit Kaboski and Townsend’s (2012) study of the effects of Thai-
land’s Village Fund with particular focuses on non-agricultural entrepreneurship, house-
hold welfare in the longer run, and heterogeneous program effects. Sanctioned by the Thai
parliament in 2001, this government program allocated one million baht (approximately
USD 65,000 in purchasing-power parity terms) to each of the country’s 79,000 villages,
regardless of village size. We use data from the Townsend Thai Project (Townsend, 2013)
for the years 1998 to 2011. For the empirical identification of program effects, we exploit
the variation in the Fund’s intensity per village household, which is reciprocal to vil-
lage size, within a difference-in-differences approach. This identification strategy deliv-
ers marginal program effects evaluated at the program’s large average intensity of 10,000
baht (650 PPP US dollars) per household, an amount roughly equal to the pre-intervention
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average of formal household borrowings.
Consistent with Kaboski and Townsend (2012) as well as other authors’ (Menkhoff
and Rungruxsirivorn 2011, Boonperm et al. 2013) results, we find an immediate and sub-
stantial increase in access to credit along the entire income distribution without crowding-
out of other forms of credit. Departing from previous findings, for the real economy, we
document, first, that the program increased business activity as measured by the share of
households operating a non-agricultural business by 20 percent. Second, there is signif-
icant heterogeneity in program effects along the wealth distribution. While we find no
effects on business activity for initially poor households, initially wealthy households ex-
pand the number of businesses and employees by 21 percent while their business assets
increase by 73 percent.
Consistent with these heterogeneous effects on entrepreneurship, we find that wel-
fare, as measured by expenditures on high-frequency consumption items, increases by
10 percent among initially wealthy households, while we find no such effect among the
initially poor. This heterogeneity persists over the ten years after the program’s inception
for which we analyze household data. As a result, the Village Fund sharpens village-level
consumption inequality, as measured by initially wealthy households’ share in aggregate
high-frequency consumption, by about half a percentage point per year.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of credit programs in
developing countries. Our first contribution is that we demonstrate important hetero-
geneities in program effects. As Banerjee et al. (2015c) point out, although average
impacts of access to institutional credit seems to be moderate, some subgroups tend to
benefit disproportionately. Similar to our results, for a microfinance expansion in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Augsburg et al. (2015) show that it is primarily households with a pre-
existing business that expand business activities when obtaining access to credit. Simi-
larly, for an urban area in India, Banerjee et al. (2015a) find that business expansion is
mostly driven by households who owned a business before a microfinance intervention.
Our main finding in this connection is that wealth is an important predictor of benefits
from the program, regarding both entrepreneurship and welfare.1
Second, we add to the evidence on the longer-term effects of access to finance. Recent
1Our finding contrasts, to some extent, the results of Boonperm et al. (2013), who use matching methods
and find that average program effects on consumption and income are concentrated at lower quantiles of
the income distribution.
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randomized impact evaluations of microcredit have found only small and insignificant
welfare effects in the short to medium run, with a negative sign of the effect in some cases
(Angelucci et al. 2015, Attanasio et al. 2015, Augsburg et al. 2015, Banerjee et al. 2015a,
Tarozzi et al. 2015, Cre´pon et al. 2015, Karlan and Zinman 2011). The two explanations
given by several of these authors are the low to moderate loan take-up rates in these
studies, which reduces the precision of intent-to-treat estimates, and the possibility of
long lags for welfare gains to materialize. Other non-experimental evaluations of large-
scale government programs tend to find positive effects on welfare, but rarely investigate
impact heterogeneity and inequality, even when long-run data is available (Burgess and
Pande 2005, Cuong 2008, Boonperm et al. 2013, Kaboski and Townsend 2012). Our
innovations here are that we document persistent welfare effects together with an increase
in consumption inequality over a time horizon of ten years. Perhaps most interestingly in
this connection, our results demonstrate that the poor appear not to reap long-term welfare
gains from credit deepening despite sizable gains in access to finance.
Given that our study is closely related to Kaboski and Townsend (2012) (hereinafter
referred to as “KT”), in particular regarding the identification strategy and data, we shall
close this introduction by highlighting the differences between their and our analysis.
First, regarding heterogeneous effects, KT only consider heterogeneity by the household
initial income, gender or education of household head. In contrast, guided by recent ev-
idence from randomized controlled trials and an interest in the distributional properties
of the program’s effects, we explore initial wealth as source of heterogeneity. Second,
regarding welfare, KT as well as our study find only a short-term effect on consumption
in the sample of all households. In addition, however, we find large long-run effects for
initially wealthy households as well as long-run effects on village-level consumption in-
equality. Finally and perhaps most importantly, regarding the mechanism of the Village
Fund’s impact on welfare, KT conclude that the program’s main effect was a transitory
consumption spike triggered by households’ running-down of buffer stocks. We challenge
this interpretation by showing that village fund credit leveraged expenditures on durable
items like housing and vehicle improvements or repairs accompanied by a transfer of the
respective assets from the consumption to the entrepreneurial sphere of the household. Put
differently, in our view the transitory consumption spike in KT veils large hidden invest-
ments in non-agricultural household enterprises not explicitly captured by the Townsend
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Thai Project’s entrepreneurship questionnaire.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the Village
Fund in detail. Section 2.3 presents our empirical methodology and data. Section 2.4
contains the results. Section 2.5 provides some robustness checks. We conclude in section
2.6.
2.2 Thailand’s Village Fund Program
2.2.1 Institutional Background
The Village and Urban Community Fund Program, commonly known as the Village Fund
Program, was launched in 2001 soon after Thaksin Shinawatra was elected as the prime
minister of Thailand. The government borrowed the idea of the Village Fund Program
from the Grameen Bank. Aiming at distributing one million baht (approximately USD
24,000) to each of the 79,000 villages in rural Thailand, this program is considered as
one of the most ambitious financial access expansion program in the world (Boonperm
et al., 2012). By the end of year 2002, the central government had spent around 80 billion
baht (USD 2.4 billion) to fund this program, amounting to 2.4 percent of Thailand’s GDP
in 2002, and 99 percent of the targeted villages had set up the fund (Pungprawat, 2012).
By the end of 2004, the active borrowers of the Village Fund added up to 11 percent
of Thailand’s population (Boonperm et al., 2012). The objectives of the Village Fund,
according to the “Act of National Village and Urban Community Fund B.E.2547”, are as
follows: (1) to be used as a revolving fund for investment, job creation, income generation,
welfare improvement and reducing expenses; (2) to be used as emergency fund to cope
with urgent problems; (3) to empower and stimulate the grassroots rural economies. The
government claimed that this program enabled the underserved and poor people to have
better access to capital (Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011).
2.2.2 Organization and Lending Policy
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the organization of the Village Fund. It consists of three levels of
administration. First and foremost is the national committee who administers the fund at
the national level and sets regulations and guidelines. Second, the sub-committees report
17
to the national committee and administrate the program at the district level. And third,
the local committees at the village level directly handle the transactions with their local
borrowers. While complying with the Village Fund Act, the local committee is entitled, to
some degree, to regulate the interest rate and repayment procedure (Tangpianpant, 2010).
Any village wishing to obtain the fund needed to satisfy the following conditions as
regulated by the national committee. First, a local committee at the village level had
to be formed. The local committee had to consist of 9 to 15 members that had been
fairly elected from the villagers.2 Half of the local committee members had to be women
(Boonperm et al., 2013). The local committee approved loan applications based on the
borrower’s ability to repay, the purpose of borrowing and the loan size (Tangpianpant,
2010). The close relationship between the local committee and borrowers mitigates the
problem of asymmetric information. Second, in terms of managing the fund, the local
committee needed to agree with the lending policy regulated by the national committee,
which states the following: the loan size could not exceed 20,000 baht per borrower,
however, in an emergency case, it could be extended to 50,000 baht. Moreover, the interest
rate was not allowed to exceed 15 percent per year. And repayment had to be made
within one year. Third, the local committee needed to submit to the national committee
an application, in which the exact interest rate and repayment procedure have to be stated.
When these conditions have been fulfilled, the national committee proceeded to eval-
uate the village’s application. After passing the evaluation, the village would receive one
million baht transfer from the central government regardless of the village size. Notice
that, the size of village is exogenous to the village’s receipt of the fund. This gener-
ates fairly exogenous variations in terms of fund intensity across villages (Kaboski and
Townsend, 2012). We explore this variation later in our estimation framework.
2These local committee members must have lived in the their villages for at least 2 years (Tangpianpant,
2010)
18
National Village and Urban Community Fund Committee
The Village Fund Circle
Local Village Fund Committee Personal Account
Sub-committee
Apply
One Million Baht
Figure 2.1: Organization of the Village Fund
2.3 Empirical Methodology
2.3.1 Quasi-experimental Setting
We use difference-in-differences method to identify treatment effects of the Village Fund.
The first difference describes the fund intensity variation across villages, and the sec-
ond difference depicts the discrepancy between pre- and post-inception of the Village
Fund. To justify this identification strategy, we show the two features of the Village Fund
program, which give the fund intensity and the timing of the intervention’s inception,
respectively, a fair degree of exogeneity.
First, each village received the same amount of transfer irrespective of the village size.
This generates a variation in fund intensity across villages, i.e., the larger the village size,
the less the Village Fund credits are available to each household in that village. This is
supported by figure 2.2, which plots the average credits borrowed from the Village Funds
against the village size. The fund intensity is determined by the village size, thus the
exogeneity of village size will justify that of fund intensity. One potential confounder
is given by the argument that the Village Fund drives the households to move to smaller
villages where the fund is more intensive. However, as the Village Fund policy states,
loans can only be lent to local villagers who have lived in the village for at least two
years. Migration with the purpose to borrow from other villages is not likely, at least not
in the short run. To further support this argument, we conduct a test and find that the
temporal change in village size does not correlate with the village size at the baseline. We
present the test in detail in Appendix 2.A.
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Figure 2.2: Average Loan Size and Village Size
Second, the Village Fund was unanticipated and implemented rapidly. This gives ex-
ogeneity to the timing of the intervention’s inception, which assures that households did
not have adjusted their behaviors before the Village Fund was implemented. In fact, the
rapid implementation was assisted by the government’s prerogative over the budgeting
system. The prerogative allows the government to dispense money from the “Central
Fund” budget without providing any details of the use. And most importantly, the prime
minister has the full control to set the limit, to which the Bureau of the Budget usually
agrees (Pungprawat, 2012). Table 2.1 shows the decomposition of the “Central Fund”
budget expenditure before and during Thaksin’s premiership. The share of the “Central
Fund” budget in the annual budget was 10% between 1997 and 2001, it increased to 19%
during Thaksin’s Premiership. Regarding the “Central Fund” expenditure, as shown in
the column under “Policy Implementation”, after Thaksin was elected, his government
started to use the “Central Fund” to finance his numerous policies, including the Village
Fund program. On the contrary, the “Central Fund” was not used for policy implementa-
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tion before Thaksin’s premiership. Pungprawat (2012) documents that, the Village Fund,
inaugurated at the end of 2001, had already reached to 99 percent of targeted villages by
the end of 2002. This fast roll-out is also confirmed by our sample, where all the sample
villages received the fund in the survey of 2002, while none of the villages received the
fund in the survey of 2001.
Table 2.1: Decomposition of the “Central Fund” Budget Expenditure Before and During
Thaksin’s Premiership
Fiscal Year Regular Items Policy Extraordinary Total
(%) Implementation(%) Budget Items(%) (%)
Pre-Thaksin 1997 100 0 0 100
1998 100 0 0 100
1999 100 0 0 100
2000 100 0 0 100
2001 100 0 0 100
Thaksin’s 2002 61 7.4 31.6 100
Premiership 2003 80.1 8.7 11.2 100
2004 67.3 4.3 28.4 100
2005 76.4 8.3 15.3 100
2006 61.2 12.5 26.3 100
Note: The data source is from Pungprawat (2012). The share of “Central Fund” budget in the annual budget
was 10% between 1997 and 2001, it increased to 19% during Thaksin’s Premiership. Policy Implementation
Items include: Village and Urban Community Fund (2002-present), Inheritance Pension (2004-2006) and
Small-Medium-Large Village Development Fund (2005-2006)
2.3.2 Data
We use household-year panel data compiled from the Townsend’s Thai Project. The panel
consists of 960 households from 64 villages that are selected from 4 rural provinces. The
sampling procedure assures the representativeness for rural households in Thailand. The
survey is administrated annually in May. In case of the interviewed households emigrating
to other regions, replacements are randomly selected in the same villages. We use 14
waves of the household survey from 1998 to 2011 (Townsend, 2013). The survey of 2011
was the most recent by the time we started this study. We focus on households, who live
in villages with a size between 50 to 400 households.3 For the short-run analysis, we use
3We trim down the 1 percent outliers. Originally, the range of the village size is 24 to 3245 households.
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the sample from 2000 to 2003, and for the long-run analysis, we use the sample from
2000 to 2011. The sample from 1998 to 2000 is reserved for placebo tests. The detailed
summary statistics are shown in table 2.2.
The village size is measured in terms of number of households. We define “fund inten-
sity” as the reciprocal of the village size in 2001 (i.e., the year just prior to the inception
of the intervention). For the sake of readability, we rescale the “fund intensity” to the unit
of 10,000 baht per household. The baseline characteristics of an average household has
1.6 children of age younger than 18 years old, 1.5 adult male and 1.6 adult female. An
average household head is 54 years old and attended 4 years of school. We also report
incidence of “initially wealthy”. We define a household as initially wealthy if it possesses
a level of wealth above its village’s median in 2001. Thus the sample is nearly equally
partitioned, with 53 percent wealthy and 47 percent poor households. The household
wealth is calculated by the sum of the value of four asset categories, namely household
assets, agricultural assets, business assets, and land holdings. Except for the business
assets module, each asset module provides a list of pre-identified items for the surveyed
households to choose and fill in the corresponding quantity and self-estimated value. Re-
garding the business assets module, an open list is provided to the surveyed households
to fill. In case of missing information on self-estimated value of an item, we impute the
value by multiplying the item’s median price in the province and year with its quantity
reported by the households.
By accident, a “village fund” borrowing channel is listed in the questionnaires in all
waves of survey. However, it does not specifically refer to the Village Fund Program,
but rather generally to any village financial institutions. This explains the fact that both
averages of the incidence of “borrow from Village Fund” and “VF credit” are visually
close but not equal to zero in the pre-intervention sample in table 2.2. However, these
averages are sharply higher in post-intervention sample, suggesting an average take-up
rate of 57 percent and average loan size of 9,000 baht. Apart from the Village Fund,
an average household also borrowed 11,000 baht from formal financial institutions, i.e.,
banks and agricultural cooperatives, and 3,000 baht from informal sources which include
moneylenders, friends and relatives.
In our analysis, business refers to non-agricultural business, which includes the fol-
lowing categories: general shop, mechanic/repair service, hair salon/barber, rice miller,
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shrimp farmer and fish farmer, vehicle rental, trader and restaurant. Before the inter-
vention, 41 percent of the sample households owned at least one such business. These
businesses are typically small in scale. Prior to the intervention, the average number of
employees (including the owner) is 1.3, where only 0.14 people are paid. In other words,
an average household in our sample owns a business that has only household members
working for it. The average business capital of a household amounts to 33,000 baht. We
define the business investment expenditure as the value of the business assets purchased
in the last 12 months. An average household spends 3,500 baht per year on the busi-
ness investment. In the context of rural Thailand, it is not uncommon to see a business
operating in the household’s residence house and using household’s vehicles. A typical
example is the street food vendor, who would use part of the residence house as cooking
and serving area, or use a motorcycle, that is otherwise used for school run, to transport
the cooking utensils and ingredients to the sale spot. 11% and 4% of total households
report house and vehicle, respectively, as business asset. This implies that 26% and 10%
business owning households use their household’s residence and vehicles for business.4
Such business operating behavior has important implication in our analysis. We discuss
the implication in further detail in the results section.
The expenditure module surveys a list of pre-identified items (self-produced and pur-
chased) where the households occur expenditure. These items are: grain, dairy product,
meat, alcohol, tobacco, gasoline, ceremonies, education, clothing, food eaten away from
home, house and vehicle repairs. The total yearly expenditure of these items was 9,700
baht per capita before the intervention. Our measure of welfare is the regular consump-
tion which is total consumption net of the house and vehicle repair expenditures because
house and vehicle have both welfare and investment aspects. The regular consumption
of an average household was 8,100 baht per capita. As we discussed previously, in the
context of small business in rural Thailand, the house and vehicle are common capital for
production. Hence, occurring larger expenditures on the repairs of these two items would
imply the increase in investment. Due to the structure of the survey, it is not possible to
disentangle the welfare and investment aspects of the repair expenditures. An average
household spent 1,600 baht per capita in a year repairing house and vehicles. Compare
to regular consumption, not only the value but also the incidence of house and vehicle re-
4Dividing 11% and 4% by 0.42, the fraction of business owning households, gives 26% and 10%.
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pair expenditures is small. Only 21 and 55 percent of the households have ever occurred
any repair expenditures on house and vehicle, respectively, before the intervention. In
comparison, all households have spent on regular consumption.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Pre-intervention Post-intervention
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Fund Intensity (10,000 baht per household) 0.965 0.451 0.966 0.463
Household Characteristics
Number of Children (< 18 year-old) 1.551 1.192 1.442 1.160
Number of Male Adults 1.467 0.939 1.433 0.859
Number of Female Adults 1.553 0.762 1.558 0.764
Household Head Age 54.029 13.401 55 13
Head Education (in year) 3.950 2.709 4.050 2.773
Wealth (in 10,000 baht) 141 397 138 424
Initially Wealthy (Incidence) 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50
Borrowing
Borrow from VF (Incidence) 0.003 0.057 0.573 0.495
VF Credit (in baht) 44 1,042 9,091 9,550
Formal Credit (in baht) 11,087 34,572 10,202 27,364
Informal Credit (in baht) 2,977 18,638 2,097 11,332
Total Credit (in baht) 14,109 40,762 21,392 33,581
Non-agricultural Business
Business Owner (Incidence) 0.407 0.491 0.499 0.500
Number of Business 0.588 0.871 0.733 0.919
All Labor 1.266 2.298 1.653 2.564
Household Labor 1.175 1.962 1.496 2.092
Market Labor 0.135 0.938 0.153 1.269
Business Asset (Stock, in baht) 33,177 216,003 32,634 203,893
Investment Expenditure (in baht) 3,588 45,694 3,766 33,922
House as Business Asset (Incidence) 0.115 0.319 0.162 0.369
Vehicle as Business Asset (Incidence) 0.044 0.205 0.045 0.206
Consumption
Total Consumption P.C. (in baht) 9,666 10,096 10,109 13,098
Regular Consumption P.C. (in baht) 8,077 6,854 8,066 6,681
House and Vehicle Rep. Expenditure P.C. (in baht) 1,588 6,559 2,042 10,437
House Repair Expenditure (Incidence) 0.208 0.406 0.221 0.415
Vehicle Repair Expenditure (Incidence) 0.551 0.498 0.606 0.489
House Rep. Exp. P.C. (in baht) 1,188 6,417 1,547 10,034
Vehicle Rep. Exp. P.C. (in baht) 400 1,198 495 1,906
Agricultural Assets
House as Agri. Asset (Incidence) 0.026 0.159 0.031 0.174
Vehicle as Agri. Asset (Incidence) 0.014 0.119 0.010 0.099
Agri. Asset (Stock, in baht) 48,838 82,299 57,291 95,535
24
2.3.3 Econometric Approach
Short-run Analysis
Following Kaboski and Townsend (2012), we use the following econometric specification
to identify the the Village Fund’s effects in the short-run (i.e., two years after the inception
of the program),
yivpt = β ∗ Intensityv ∗Postt+X ′ivptγ+ηivp+αt+θpt+uivpt , (2.1)
where yivpt is an outcome of household i from village v and province p in year t. Intensityv
is the inverse of village v’s size in 2001.5 We scale up the intensity to the unit of 10,000
baht per household, which is approximately the average intensity in post-program years.
Postt is a dummy variable for post-intervention period (i.e., year 2002 and 2003. The
reference period is from year 2000 to 2001).6 Xivpt is a vector of household demographic
controls, including numbers of children, female and male adults, household head’s age
and age squared, head’s years of education. Household fixed effects, ηivp, capture the
unobserved household time-invariant characteristics, and encapsulate the village fixed ef-
fects which include village size. Year fixed effects, αt , captures other secular changes
unobserved by the researcher. We also include the province-year fixed effects, θpt , which
control for the time-variant factors at the province level, e.g. purchasing power. We clus-
ter the standard error at the village level.
In this estimation framework, the coefficient β identifies the marginal intent-to-treat
(MITT) effect of the program, i.e., the effect of increasing the fund intensity by 10,000
baht per household. The effect identified here differs from the average intent-to-treat
effect (AITT), which, for its identification, requires a control group of untreated villages.
However, untreated villages do not exist in our sample.
For heterogeneous program effects by initial wealth, we use the following specifica-
5We do not use contemporaneous village size to avoid endogeneity issues regarding village size in post-
program years. Nonetheless, all our results are robust to using contemporaneous village size.
6Our results are robust to alternative choices of period. Precisely, our eight alternative choices are, 1998-
2003, 1998-2004, 1998-2005, 1999-2003, 1999-2004, 1999-2005, 2000-2004, 2000-2005. Compared to
these alternatives, our results yield the most conservative estimates for most of the outcome variables.
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tion,
yivpt = δ ∗ Intensityv ∗Postt ∗Highwealthivp+(X ′ivptσ)∗Highwealthivp
+ β ∗ Intensityv ∗Postt+X ′ivptγ+ηivp+αt+θpt+uivpt , (2.2)
where Highwealthivp is a dummy variable equal to one if a household i’s initial wealth is
above the median wealth in its village v. Thus the coefficient δ captures the program effect
heterogeneity, i.e., the additional treatment effect for the initially wealthy households,
relevant to the initially poor households.
Long-run Analysis
In our long-run analysis, we group every two years into a period. Thus we have one pre-
intervention period (i.e., 2000-2001) and five post-intervention periods (i.e., 2002-2003,
2004-2005,2006-2007,2008-2009 and 2010-2011). We use the following specification,
yivpt =
5
∑
τ=1
βτ ∗ Intensityv ∗PERIODτt +X ′ivptγ+ηivp+αt+θpt+uivpt , (2.3)
where PERIODτt are dummy variables that indicate year t belongs to period τ , with τ
indicating one of the five post-intervention periods. The reference period is the pre-
intervention period (i.e., from 2000 to 2001). Other variables’ definitions remain un-
changed. βτ thus identifies the marginal program effects in period τ .
Village-level Analysis
We also conduct a village-level analysis of the program effect on the intra-village inequal-
ity. The specification takes the following form,
WRCSharevpt =
5
∑
τ=1
βτ ∗ Intensityv ∗PERIODτt +X ′vptγ+ηvp+αt+θpt+uvpt , (2.4)
where WRCSharevpt is the wealthy households’ share of regular consumption in village
v, province p and year t. Precisely,
WRCSharevpt =
∑15i=1RCivpt ∗Highwealthivp
∑15i=1RCivpt
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where RCivpt refers to the regular consumption in baht of the household i in village v
province p and year t. There are 15 households per village. Model (2.4) is practically
the same as model (2.3), with Xvpt being a vector of village level controls, which are the
village means of the Xivpt in model (2.3).
2.4 Results
Using model (2.1), we report the program effects, β , on a list of outcomes for an average
household in column (1) of table 2.3. Separating the full sample by initial wealth, column
(2) and (3) report the effects for an initially wealthy and poor household, respectively.
Column (4) reports the corresponding effect heterogeneity, δ , using model (2.2).
2.4.1 Financial Inclusion
We begin by showing the effects on households’ borrowings. Consistent with Kaboski
and Townsend (2012) as well as other authors’ (Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn 2011,
Boonperm et al. 2013) results, we find a substantial increase in access to credit along the
entire income distribution without crowding-out of other forms of credit. As pointed out
previously, the “village fund” channel was rarely used by the households for obtaining
credit. We estimate an average take-up of the program of 57 percentage points by the
simple pre- and post-program difference in the incidence of borrowing from the village
fund channel as indicated in summary statistics (Table 2.2). In comparison, other studies
of smaller-scale microcredit programs typically find average take-up rates of around 20
percent (Tarozzi et al. 2015, Banerjee et al. 2015a, Cre´pon et al. 2015, Angelucci et al.
2015). In terms of the marginal effect, column (1) shows that a marginal increase of
10,000 baht per household in the program fund increases the Village Fund take-up rate
by 20 percentage points (row 1). Regarding the loan size, an average household borrows
6,640 baht from the program for every 10,000 baht per household injected in the village
fund (row 2). Comparing column (2) to (3), the wealthy households have a slightly lower
take-up but a larger loan size from the program. However, as shown in column (4), the
difference in the point estimates between the two samples are insignificant, indicating that
the program reaches out to the wealthy and poor alike. Furthermore, the program does not
27
crowd out informal or formal sources of borrowing (row 3 and 4).7 Overall, the program
has significantly increased the total borrowings of an average household by 6,600 baht
(row 5), a value that is 47% of the total borrowings of an average household before the
program.
2.4.2 Entrepreneurship
One of the key promises of microfinance is that access to microcredit promotes growth
among the small and medium-scale entrepreneurs in developing countries. This argument
is based on the hypothesis that the small and medium-scale entrepreneurs in this setting
have large returns to capital but are financially constrained (de Mel et al., 2008). When
relaxing this constraint, these enterprises prosper by harnessing the large returns to capi-
tal. Microcredit thus provides a solution to relax the constraint. However, the empirical
evidence regarding the effects of access to credit in this connection is not conclusive (An-
gelucci et al. 2015, Tarozzi et al. 2015, Banerjee et al. 2015a Kaboski and Townsend 2012,
Burgess and Pande 2003).
In our analysis, we focus on the non-agricultural businesses, which include gen-
eral shop, mechanic/repair service, hair salon/barber, rice miller, shrimp farmer and fish
farmer, vehicle rental, trader and restaurant. Households can operate multiple businesses
at the same time, and we define a business owner as a household owning at least one
non-agricultural business. We analyze the effects on the entrepreneurial activity on both
extensive and intensive margin.
On the extensive margin, we find that the program has improved the share of business
owning households by 8 percentage points (row 6), a 20 percent increase relative to the
baseline level. On the other hand, we do not find effects on any intensive margin mea-
sures, i.e., number of businesses, number of workers, value of business asset, investment
expenditure (row 7 to 12).
However, the heterogeneity analysis reveals that the initially wealthy households ex-
perience a significant business expansion while the poor households remain silent (column
2 and 3). Precisely, we find that, in response to a marginal increase of 10,000 baht per
household in the Village Fund program, the initially wealthy households raised the num-
7“Formal credits” include the credits borrowed from agricultural cooperatives, production credit group,
commercial banks and rice bank. “Informal credits” include the credits from neighbor, relative, moneylen-
der, store owner, supplier, purchaser, landlord and other unspecified.
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ber of businesses by 0.157, a value that is 21% of the average number of businesses among
wealthy households before the program (row 7). They also increased the total labor by
0.355 persons, a 20% improvement from the baseline value (row 8).8 This expansion of
labor employment is driven by household labor (row 9), rather than market labor (row
10). Moreover, the program increased the total value of business assets of the wealthy
households by 73 percentage points (row 11).
While the wealthy households manage to accumulate their business assets stock, they
do not achieve this by purchasing new business assets, as the effect on “Investment Ex-
penditure” is not significant (row 12). There are two possible explanations. First, the
increase in business asset holdings is leveraged by wealthy households. For example, if a
household has been saving toward the purchase of a truck, the loan from the Village Fund
facilitates the purchase together with the accumulated savings. This pattern, however is
not consistent with the lack of impact on asset purchases (“Investment Expenditure”).
The second possibility is that the increase in business assets results from re-dedicating
preexisting household assets (e.g. vehicles or part of the household’s real estate) that were
not used for business purposes previously. And the Village Fund facilitates the adaptation
of these assets to business purpose by financing the cost of adaptation (e.g. house reno-
vation). As discussed previously, it is not uncommon to see a business operating in the
household’s residence house and using household’s vehicles (e.g. motorcycle). A typical
example is the street food vendor, who would use part of the residence house as cooking
and serving area, or use a motorcycle to transport the cooking utensils and ingredients to
the sale spot. To explore this possibility, we investigate whether wealthy households are
more likely to report house or vehicle as business assets. Column (2) of row (13) and
(14) strongly support this hypothesis. They show that the Village Fund increases wealthy
households’ propensity of declaring real estate or vehicles as business assets by 7 and
3 percentage points, respectively, which corresponds to a 44 percent and a 55 percent
increase from pre-intervention levels.9 Accordingly, only wealthy households witnessed
significant program effects on vehicle and house repairs, for which expenditures almost
double (an additional 65% increase, to be exact) as shown in row (15).
Similar effects are lacking on agricultural production activity, as we do not observe
80.756 and 1.735 are the means of business assets value and all labor employed, respectively, among the
initially wealthy households at the baseline.
9The means of reporting house and vehicle as business assets are 0.158 and 0.06, respectively, for the
wealthy households.
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any agricultural assets accumulation or re-dedication of house and vehicle to agricultural
activity (row 16 to 18).
Overall, our results on entrepreneurship suggest that non-agricultural business expan-
sion activities are concentrated among wealthy households. They expand their household
business by adapting their preexisting house and vehicle to business use and thus occur
higher expenditure on house and vehicle repair, which are essentially hidden business
investments.
2.4.3 Consumption
To analyze the impact on welfare, we focus on the effect on regular consumption, which
is total consumption net of house and vehicle repair expenditures. Measured in loga-
rithmic term, we do not find significant effect on regular consumption per capita for an
average household. However, consistent with the pattern of heterogeneity regarding en-
trepreneurial activity, we find that the program significantly improves the welfare only
for the wealthy households. Specifically, as shown in row (20) of Table 2.3, an marginal
increase in the fund intensity by 10,000 baht per household improves the wealthy house-
holds’ per capita regular consumption by 10% (column 2). In comparison, the effect is
mute for the poor households (column 3). To make the comparison more robust, the het-
erogeneous effect on regular consumption between the wealthy and poor households are
also statistically significant (column 4).
We extent the welfare analysis to long-term, i.e., to year 2011. We group every two
years into a period, thus we have one pre-intervention period (i.e., 2000-2001) and five
post-intervention periods. Using model (2.3), we estimate the effects on the regular con-
sumption in each of the five post-intervention periods, for the wealthy and poor house-
holds separately. For ease of reading, we plot the point estimates of βτ and the correspond-
ing 90% confidence intervals in the upper panel of Figure 2.3. As we can read in the plot,
the pattern of impact heterogeneity from the short-term analysis persists to 10 years after
the inception of the program. While the poor households’ welfare remains stagnant (line
with triangular markers), the wealthy households experience a sustained increase of 10
percent in regular consumption (line with square markers). Moreover, the gap between
these two lines slightly widens along the years. More formally, we test whether the differ-
30
Table 2.3: The Village Fund Program’s Short-term Effects
β from model (2.1) δ from model (2.2)
Sample Full Wealthy Poor Full
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Inclusion
(1) Borrow from VF (Incidence) 0.201∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ -0.034
(0.053) (0.066) (0.068) (0.084)
(2) VF Credit (in Baht) 6641∗∗∗ 7790∗∗∗ 5508∗∗∗ 2282
(1063) (1371) (1193) (1550)
(3) Formal Credit (in Baht) 2196 6921 -2657 9579∗∗
(3111) (4623) (2240) (4238)
(4) Informal Credit (in Baht) -2269 -4625 715 -5341
(2462) (4322) (1014) (4359)
(5) Total Credit (in Baht) 6567∗ 10086∗ 3566 6520
(3736) (6039) (2462) (6224)
Entrepreneurship
(6) Business Owner (Incidence) 0.083∗ 0.081 0.088 -0.006
(0.047) (0.058) (0.063) (0.074)
(7) Number of Business 0.093 0.157∗ 0.02 0.136
(0.07) (0.088) (0.095) (0.117)
(8) All Labor 0.136 0.355∗ -0.138 0.493∗
(0.136) (0.187) (0.192) (0.262)
(9) Household Labor 0.125 0.305∗ -0.101 0.407∗
(0.132) (0.166) (0.193) (0.238)
(10) Market Labor -0.008 -0.017 0.003 -0.02
(0.038) (0.075) (0.013) (0.082)
(11) Business Asset (Stock, in Baht, in log) 0.36 0.728∗ -0.083 0.811
(0.284) (0.42) (0.364) (0.561)
(12) Investment Expenditure (in Baht, in Log) -0.073 -0.181 0.026 -0.208
(0.241) (0.337) (0.252) (0.36)
(13) House as Business Asset (Incidence) 0.036 0.07∗∗ -0.009 0.079∗∗
(0.023) (0.03) (0.03) (0.039)
(14) Vehicle as Business Asset (Incidence) 0.02 0.033∗ 0.003 0.029
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024)
(15) House & Vehicle Rep. Expend P.C. 0.329 0.65∗∗ -0.107 0.756∗
(in Baht, in log) (0.23) (0.321) (0.293) (0.411)
Agricultural Assets
(16) House as Agri. Asset (Incidence) 0.007 -0.005 0.021 -0.026∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
(17) Vehicle as Agri. Asset (Incidence) 0.006 0.013 -0.001 0.014
(0.005) (0.01) (0.004) (0.011)
(18) Agri. Asset (Stock, in Baht, in log) 0.299 0.219 0.387 -0.168
(0.222) (0.213) (0.43) (0.478)
Consumption
(19) Total Consumption P.C. (in Baht, in log) 0.061 0.173∗∗∗ -0.081 0.254∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.055) (0.061) (0.074)
(20) Regular Consumption P.C. (in Baht, in log) 0.033 0.099∗∗ -0.048 0.147∗∗
(0.033) (0.042) (0.051) (0.062)
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the village level and given in parentheses. * Significant at 10-percent
level. ** Significant at 5-percent level. *** Significant at 1-percent level.
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ences in these point estimates between the wealthy and poor households are significantly
different from zero. The point estimates of the differences and their corresponding 90%
confidence intervals are plotted in the lower panel. It shows that the wealthy households
benefit more than the poor by about 10 percentage points in the period of 2002-2003. This
difference increases to about 20 percentage points in the period of 2010-2011. Moreover,
these point estimates display an ascending trend of approximately 1.2 percentage points
per period.
Effect Heterogeneity
Effect on Regular Consumption (Log)
2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010-2011
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Period
Full Poor WealthyMM
Note: The upper panel plots the point estimates of βτs of model (2.3) using wealthy and poor households
sample separately. The standard errors are clustered at the village level. The ribbons display the 90%
confidence intervals of the corresponding point estimates. The effect heterogeneity is the estimate of the
difference in effect on regular consumption (log) between wealthy and poor households, with the poor being
the reference group.
Figure 2.3: Long-term Effects on Regular Consumption
The persisting widening of heterogeneity of effect on welfare between the wealthy and
poor households motivates us to investigate the effect on intra-village welfare inequality
in the long-run. We measure the welfare inequality of a village by the wealthy house-
holds’ share of the aggregate regular consumption in the village. Using model (2.4), we
estimate the effects on this inequality indicator in each of the five post-intervention pe-
riods. The point estimates and their 90% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 2.4.
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Overall, the point estimates indicate that the wealthy households’ share of regular con-
sumption increase by around 1.4 percentage points for an average period. Although the
point estimates are not precisely estimated, they display an obvious ascending trend. To
test whether the trend is significantly ascending, we estimate a linear trend model as fol-
low,
WRCSharevpt = δ ∗ Intensityv ∗Postt (2.5)
+λ ∗ Intensityv ∗RPeriodt
+X ′vptγ+ηvp+αt+θpt+uvpt
where RPeriodt is an integer variable whose range is between 0 and 5, with 0, 1, ..., 5
corresponding to the pre-intervention period, 2002-2003, ..., 2010-2011. Other variables’
definitions remain unchanged. Intuitively, model (2.5) fits a line on the five βτ estimates
of model (2.4) with a slope of λ and intercept of δ . The estimated line is plotted in
Figure 2.4. Confirming with the pattern of long-run regular consumption, the fitted line
shows that the effects on the inequality exhibits an ascending trend of 1.12 percentage
points per period (significant at 5% level), or approximately half percentage point per
year, against a secular decrease during the ten post-intervention years (-1.92 percentage
points). Overall, the long-run analysis on welfare suggests that the program sharpens the
intra-village inequality.
To sum up, our results suggest that, by expanding business activities, wealthy house-
holds are able to enjoy a long term improvement in regular consumption. On the other
hand, for poor households, we find neither an effect on business expansion nor an ef-
fect on consumption, despite of sizable gains regarding financial inclusion. More broadly
speaking, our findings suggest that wealth and access to credit appear to be complements
rather than substitutes for business expansion and long-term welfare gains.
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Note: The standard errors are clustered at the village level. For model (4), the point estimates of the β s are
plotted in grey dots, with their 90% confidence intervals displayed as error bars. For the linear trend model,
model (2.5), the standard errors of the intercept and slope are shown in the parentheses.
Figure 2.4: Long-term Effects Consumption Inequality
2.5 Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Placebo Test
The difference-in-differences method of our analysis assumes a parallel trend among the
compared groups, i.e., villages with different sizes (fund intensities) would witness same
growth of outcome variables in the absence of the intervention. To test the validity of the
parallel trend assumption, we perform a placebo test by running models (2.1) and (2.2)
using only pre-intervention data, i.e., from 1998 to 2001. We treat the latter two years
(i.e., 2000 and 2001) as pseudo-post-intervention years. The hypothesis that, if there is
parallel trend, the estimates of β of model (2.1) and δ of model (2.2) should be zero. I
report the placebo test results in Table 2.4. This placebo test finds no statistically result
for all outcome variables. In fact, the point estimates also lack economic significance.
For example, the estimate for “Borrow from VF” is only -0.004 and statistically insignifi-
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cant, indicating that in the absence of the intervention a larger fund intensity (i.e., smaller
village size) does not predict a larger propensity to borrow from the village fund chan-
nel. This confirms that the significant estimate of 0.2 in row (1) of Table 2.3 is driven
by the intervention. Similarly, the placebo effects for the entrepreneurship and consump-
tion variables among the wealthy households (column 2 of Table 2.4) are much smaller
and closer to zero than their counterparts in Table 2.3. Overall, the placebo test results
reinforce that the econometric model (2.1) is capable of identifying the program effects.
2.5.2 Impact Heterogeneity regarding Village Size
Village size could be a source of impact heterogeneity. For example, the smaller the vil-
lage, the less competitive the supply side, and therefore, the more intensely the Village
Fund affects business expansion. On the other hand, a smaller village has less demand,
and thus the Village Fund affects business expansion less intensely. Therefore, whether
there is impact heterogeneity by the village size is an empirical question. And one concern
is that this impact heterogeneity biases the estimate of MITT for an average household.
To address this concern, we now prove that even there exists impact heterogeneity regard-
ing village size, our estimate of MITT still remains unbiased for households from small
villages. For simplicity’s sake, we specify the model as follows,
yivt = f (IPivt ,Siv)+X ′ivtγ+αiv+ηt+ εivt (2.6)
where IPivt = Intensityiv ∗Postt and f (IPivt ,Siv) is a general response function of a
outcome variable with respect to fund intensity and village size for the household i from
village v in year t. To approximate this response function, we apply a second degree taylor
expansion around the average point (IPivt ,Siv), i.e., (IP,S). This is because we want to
assess the treatment effect for an average household. For ease of readability, we drop the
subscripts i and v. The approximated response function is thus:
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Table 2.4: Placebo Test
β from model (2.1) δ from model (2.2)
Sample Full Wealthy Poor Full
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Inclusion
(1) Borrow from VF (Incidence) -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 0.003
(0.006) (0.01) (0.011) (0.016)
(2) VF Credit (in Baht) -114 -177 -44 -133
(84) (155) (40) (163)
(3) Formal Credit (in Baht) 1241 1588 818 770
(2052) (3081) (1865) (3143)
(4) Informal Credit (in Baht) 1790 3826 -569 4396
(2759) (5298) (1323) (5903)
(5) Total Credit (in Baht) 2917 5237 203 5033
(3564) (6541) (2164) (7167)
Entrepreneurship
(6) Business Owner (Incidence) -0.014 -0.006 -0.026 0.02
(0.042) (0.052) (0.051) (0.058)
(7) Number of Business 0.037 0.086 -0.023 0.109
(0.058) (0.082) (0.063) (0.09)
(8) All Labor 0.059 0.074 0.012 0.062
(0.121) (0.192) (0.141) (0.237)
(9) Household Labor 0.052 0.083 -0.003 0.087
(0.113) (0.168) (0.143) (0.218)
(10) Market Labor 0.008 -0.002 0.009 -0.011
(0.036) (0.066) (0.022) (0.074)
(11) Business Asset (Stock, in Baht, in log) 0.005 -0.042 0.055 -0.097
(0.274) (0.359) (0.371) (0.48)
(12) Investment Expenditure (in Baht, in Log) 0.09 0.034 0.113 -0.079
(0.217) (0.309) (0.2) (0.32)
(13) House as Business Asset (Incidence) -0.01 -0.025 0.004 -0.03
(0.034) (0.043) (0.033) (0.04)
(14) Vehicle as Business Asset (Incidence) -0.003 0.011 -0.021 0.031
(0.013) (0.02) (0.013) (0.021)
(15) House and Vehicle Rep. Expenditure P.C. -0.156 -0.194 -0.106 -0.088
(in Baht, in log) (0.266) (0.403) (0.433) (0.633)
Agricultural Assets
(16) House as Agri. Asset (Incidence) 0.003 0.015 -0.013 0.028
(0.009) (0.013) (0.01) (0.017)
(17) Vehicle as Agri. Asset (Incidence) -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.002
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
(18) Agri. Asset (Stock, in Baht, in log) -0.079 -0.067 -0.133 0.067
(0.196) (0.304) (0.229) (0.384)
Consumption
(19) Total Consumption P.C. (in Baht, in log) -0.01 -0.04 0.017 -0.057
(0.05) (0.069) (0.07) (0.098)
(20) Regular Consumption P.C. (in Baht, in log) 0.01 0.001 0.014 -0.013
(0.056) (0.088) (0.058) (0.103)
Note: This placebo test is based on the data from 1998 to 2001 with 2000 and 2001 regarded as pseudo-post-
intervention period. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and given in parentheses. * Significant
at 10-percent level. ** Significant at 5-percent level. *** Significant at 1-percent level.
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f (IP,S) = f (IP,S)+ f1(IP,S)∗ (IP− IP)+ f2(IP,S)∗ (S−S)
+
1
2
f11(IP,S)∗ (IP− IP)2+ 12 f22(IP,S)∗ (S−S)
2
+ f12(IP,S)∗ (IP− IP)∗ (S−S) (2.7)
where f1(IP,S) and f2(IP,S) are the first partial derivatives with respect to IP and S,
respectively. Similarly, f11(IP,S) and f22(IP,S) are the second partial derivatives with
respect to IP and S, respectively. And f12(IP,S) is the heterogeneous effect by village
size. All derivatives are evaluating at (IP,S).
When we plug equation (2.7) in (2.6), f (IP,S) is immediately captured by time fixed
effects ηt . Moreover, f2(IP,S) and f22(IP,S) are encapsulated in household fixed effects.
Then the real MITT with respect to IP is:
MITT =
∂ f (IP,S)
∂ IP
= f1(IP,S)+ f11(IP,S)∗ (IP− IP)+ f12(IP,S)∗ (S−S) (2.8)
However, we are unable to disentangle IP and S as we defined S=
1
IP
. We would
actually estimate the following response function, which is obtained by plugging in S=
1
IP
in equation (2.7).
f˜ (IP,S) = f (IP,S)+ f1(IP,S)∗ (IP− IP)+ f2(IP,S)∗ (S−S)
+
1
2
f11(IP,S)∗ (IP− IP)2+ 12 f22(IP,S)∗ (S−S)
2
+ f12(IP,S)∗ (1+ IPS− IPS− IPS) (2.9)
Therefore, the estimated MITT becomes:
M˜ITT =
∂ f˜ (IP,S)
∂ IP
= f1(IP,S)+ f11(IP,S)∗ (IP− IP)− f12(IP,S)∗S (2.10)
We can immediatelt see that,M˜ITT =MITT, if f12 = 0 or S= 0M˜ITT 6=MITT, otherwise
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That is, the estimated effect, M˜ITT , is unbiased when there exist no impact heterogeneity
by village size (i.e., f12 = 0) or when village size is small (i.e., S=0).
2.5.3 Nonlinear Treatment Effects
Another interest of estimate is the average intent-to-treat effect (AITT). However, our
linear identification strategy cannot distinguish AITT from marginal intent-to-treat effect
(MITT). Therefore, we augment the model to a quadratic form to analyze the nonlinear
treatment effects for an average household. We will discuss the implied AITT and MITT
as well as whether there is significant difference between them. The augmented model is
specified as follows:
yivpt = β1Intensityv ∗Postt+β2Intensity2v ∗Postt+X ′ivptγ+ηivp+αt+θpt+ εivpt(2.11)
We scale up the unit of “Intensity” to “10,000 baht per household”. Given the average
fund intensity being approximately 10,000 baht per household (Table 2.2), this nonlinear
model implies the following estimates:
AITT = β1+β2 , i.e., ITT at “Intensity”=1 (in 10,000 baht per household)
MITT0 = β1 , i.e., MITT at “Intensity”=0
MITT1 = β1+2∗β2 , i.e., MITT at “Intensity”=1
Moreover, the statistical significance of β2 tells the significance of the difference between
AITT and MITT1, i.e., whether there is difference between the average and marginal
effect.10 Given that our main results are driven by the wealthy households, we test the
nonlinearity of effects only for the wealthy households. The results are presented in table
2.5. We also report the p-value of the joint-F test on β1 and β2.
For those variables whose estimates are significant in Table 2.3, we also find non-
zero treatment effects using the nonlinear model, as suggested by the p-values of the
joint-F tests being smaller than 0.1. Robustly, the estimates of MITT1 of the nonlinear
model are very close to the MITT (i.e., column (2) in table 2.3) estimated using our main
specification (model 2.1)
10It also shows the difference between MITT0 and MITT1, but it is not the focus of our discussion in this
section.
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Regarding the existence of nonlinear effects, the estimates of β2 are not significant
and the magnitudes are rather small for the financial inclusion and consumption variables,
suggesting that the correlation between fund intensity and village fund credit (row 1 and
2) and consumption (row 20) are fairly linear. Both marginal and average effects are
significantly different from zero (row 1 and 2). In terms of the entrepreneurship variables,
there is also a lack of nonlinear effects on business ownership, number of businesses
owned and using vehicle for business purpose (the estimates of β2 are also insignificant
and small for row 6, 7 and 14). In comparison, the β2 are less precisely estimated for
business assets and labor, as indicated by the large standard errors (row 8, 11, 13 and
15). Moreover, the magnitudes are also large, which may imply zero average effects (the
AITT are very close to zero in row 11, 13 and 15).
Overall, we find that the intervention’s impacts are fairly linear for wealthy house-
holds’ borrowings, business ownership and regular consumption. However, the nonlinear
effects might exist for business assets and labor.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the impacts of Thailand’s Village Fund program, a large scale de-
centralized government lending program, on entrepreneurship and welfare. We find that,
while the impacts for an average household appears to be moderate, there is substantial
impact heterogeneity along the wealth distribution.
More precisely, while initially wealthy households improve their consumption both in
the short- and long-run, initially poor households do not reap off similar welfare gains.
This explains the sharpening of intra-village inequality in consumption in the long-run.
We argue that business expansion is likely to be the mechanism behind these heteroge-
neous welfare gains. In support of our argument, we find that wealthy households accu-
mulate business assets by adapting preexisting house and vehicle to business use, rather
than acquiring new assets. Precisely, we find that the Village Fund increases the expen-
diture on house and vehicle repairs among the wealthy households. On the contrary, the
initially poor households do not achieve similar gains regarding business expansion, even
though they benefit from the Village Fund in terms of financial inclusion. One obvious
question is why there is a lack of impacts on business expansion for the poor. One expla-
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Table 2.5: Nonlinear Treatment Effects for Wealthy Households
β1 β2 Joint-F MITT1 AITT
Financial Inclusion
(1) Borrow from VF (Incidence) 0.44 -0.11 0.22∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.28) (0.12) [0.00] [0.00] [0.05]
(2) VF Credit (in Baht) 11969∗∗ -1892 8184∗∗∗ 10076∗∗∗
(5293) (2373) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
(3) Formal Credit (in Baht) -7545 6552 5558 -993
(20524) (8991) [0.16] [0.22] [0.93]
(4) Informal Credit (in Baht) 15347∗ -9045∗∗ -2743 6301
(8008) (4154) [0.10] [0.40] [0.17]
(5) Total Credit (in Baht) 19770 -4385 10999∗ 15384
(23262) (10142) [0.15] [0.06] [0.26]
Entrepreneurship
(6) Business Owner (Incidence) 0.22 -0.06 0.09∗ 0.15
(0.19) (0.09) [0.18] [0.07] [0.16]
(7) Number of Business 0.15 0.004 0.16∗ 0.15
(0.36) (0.16) [0.13] [0.07] [0.47]
(8) All Labor 1.26 -0.41 0.44∗∗∗ 0.85∗
(0.78) (0.35) [0.04] [0.01] [0.06]
(9) Household Labor 0.20 0.05 0.30∗∗ 0.25
(0.65) (0.29) [0.11] [0.05] [0.50]
(10) Market Labor 0.53 -0.25 0.03 0.28
(0.61) (0.26) [0.49] [0.73] [0.42]
(11) Business Asset (Stock, in Baht, in log) -0.83 0.70 0.58∗ -0.12
(1.28) (0.60) [0.11] [0.10] [0.87]
(12) Investment Expenditure (in Baht, in Log) -0.40 0.10 -0.20 -0.30
(1.19) (0.58) [0.73] [0.44] [0.64]
(13) House as Business Asset (Incidence) -0.11 0.08∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.03
(0.10) (0.04) [0.00] [0.05] [0.61]
(14) Vehicle as Business Asset (Incidence) 0.01 0.01 0.03∗∗ 0.02
(0.07) (0.03) [0.08] [0.05] [0.55]
(15) House and Vehicle Rep. Expenditure P.C. -0.47 0.51 0.54∗ 0.04
(1.16) (0.50) [0.03] [0.07] [0.95]
Agricultural Assets
(16) House as Agri. Asset (Incidence) 0.17∗∗ -0.08∗∗ 0.01 0.09∗
(0.08) (0.03) [0.02] [0.45] [0.06]
(17) Vehicle as Agri. Asset (Incidence) 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.02) [0.28] [0.18] [0.39]
(18) Agri. Asset (Stock, in Baht, in log) -0.03 0.11 0.20 0.09
(0.76) (0.33) [0.47] [0.32] [0.85]
Consumption
(19) Total Consumption P.C. (in Baht, in log) 0.25 -0.04 0.18∗∗∗ 0.22
(0.25) (0.10) [0.00] [0.00] [0.14]
(20) Regular Consumption P.C. (in Baht, in log) 0.16 -0.03 0.10∗∗ 0.13
(0.19) (0.08) [0.02] [0.02] [0.24]
Note: To analogize to the analysis in column (2) table (2.3), we use data of the wealthy households from
2000 to 2003. The standard errors are clustered at the village level and given in parentheses. β1 and β2 refer
to the coefficients of the linear and quadratic terms, respectively, of model (2.11). The “joint-F” test tests
for the joint significance of β1 and β2 with its p-value given in brackets. * Significant at 10-percent level.
** Significant at 5-percent level. *** Significant at 1-percent level.
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nation is that the poor use their loan for consumption smoothing rather than investment,
or simply they are untalented entrepreneurs who exit their business within one year, thus
the change in assets is not picked up by the annual survey.
This paper sheds light on the importance of initial wealth in channeling the effects
of access to credit. Contrast to the conventional argument, initial wealth complements
rather than substitutes the access to credit when it comes to business expansion. This
might explain, why most of microcredit interventions fail to bring welfare gains to ultra-
poor households, who are deprived of household assets. Therefore, to improve welfare
for the ultra-poor through fostering entrepreneurship, interventions, such as a graduation
program (Banerjee et al., 2015b), might be more effective than microcredit.
At the end, another point worth mentioning is that, the credit from Village Fund has a
consumption dividend of 10 percent for a wealthy household. The question followed is,
why households, especially wealthy households, did not reap off such a high consumption
dividend by obtaining credit from other financial institutions? This might imply a high
borrowing cost from other financial institutions. Further studies on this question would
be desirable.
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Appendix
2.A Test for the Change in Village Size
In this section, we test whether households migrate to smaller villages where fund is more
intensive. If the statement is true, it implies that villages with a larger size at the baseline
grows slower than those with a initially smaller size. This implication can be tested with
the following model,
Sizevt = β ∗Size1998v ∗Postt+αv+ηt+uvt (2.12)
where Sizevt is the size of village v in year t. Size1998v measures the initial size of village v
as its size in 1998. Postt is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if year t is post the inception
of the intervention, i.e., year 2002. αv and ηt are village and year fixed effects. uvt is
the error term. β delivers the correlation between the initial village size and the temporal
change in village size. We cluster the standard errors at the village level. We use the
sample from 1998 to 2003.
The estimate of β is presented in Table 2.6. The point estimate is -0.031, meaning that
an addition of one household in 1998 is associated with a smaller change in the village size
by 0.031 households. However, the magnitude of this point estimate is rather nominal.
Furthermore, the point estimate is not statistically significant. Taken together, this result
suggests that there is no significant correlation between the initial village size and the
temporal change in village size. This supports our argument that there is no migration to
smaller villages.
Table 2.6: Test for the Change in Village Size
Dependent variable:
Village Size
Initial Village Size * Post −0.031
(0.072)
Observations 384
Adjusted R2 0.877
Note: An observation is a village. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and reported in paren-
theses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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CHAPTER 3
A Financial Inclusion Policy Gone
Wrong: Pakistan’s Bank Branch
Expansion Reform
Abstract Government interventions for expanding bank branch networks into rural ar-
eas have played a prominent role in the development strategies of numerous low-income
countries. Several studies have documented beneficial effects of such policies on financial
access and poverty reduction, especially for India. In this paper I examine the effects of
Pakistan’s rural bank branch expansion policy, by which commercial banks had to open
at least 20 percent of their new branches in “Rural and Underserved Areas (RUA)”. I
show that banks complied with the policy but that the bulk of additional RUA branches
is located on the fringes of urban centers, where dense branch networks already existed.
This has sharpened spatial inequalities in bank branch coverage between more and less
remote rural areas. As a result, the policy failed to reach out to unbanked rural areas and
the fraction of the country’s banked rural population stayed stagnant at 57%. Consistent
with this branch-opening pattern, I also show that the policy has failed to expand credit
disbursement to the agricultural sector and reduce poverty. My results are consistent with
commercial banks’ reluctance to expand their branch networks into remote rural areas.
They demonstrate the need for more carefully designed government interventions for im-
proving financial access than Pakistan’s arguably naı¨ve bank branch expansion policy.
43
3.1 Introduction
Access to finance has been seen as a key factor in economic growth as it provides fa-
cilities for mobilizing savings and accumulating capital stock, spurring investment and
mitigating risk (Karlan and Morduch, 2010). A positive correlation between financial de-
velopment and economic growth has been documented in both cross- and within-country
studies (King and Levine 1993, Jayaratne and Strahan 1996, Rajan and Zingales 1998,
Levine and Zervos 1998, Bekaert et al. 2005). However, it is well known that rural house-
holds in low-income countries have traditionally faced large impediments to access to
formal finance (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). In response, financially including the rural
households into formal finance can thus bring efficiency and equity gains. The impor-
tance of financial inclusion has also been echoed in the UN’s 2030 agenda which has
prioritized financial inclusion as an enabler for achieving the “Sustainable Development
Goals” (United Nations, 2015).
These arguments have often provided justification for widespread financial inclusion
interventions. While the last two decades have seen the rise of microfinance promoted by
NGOs, the majority of financial inclusion interventions remain state-led. These state-led
interventions have mostly taken the forms of subsidized credit, no-frills savings accounts,
mobile banking and rural bank network expansion (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. 2017). Rural
bank network expansion has been a popular policy in developing countries since the 60s.1
Such a policy mandates banks to open branches in underserved locations. The rationale is
backed by a line of empirical studies that have established a positive correlation between
closer geographical proximity to financial institutions and higher financial services take-
up (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Degryse and Ongena 2005, Agarwal and Hauswald 2010,
Brevoort et al. 2012, Nguyen 2019, Brown et al. 2016, Carletti et al. 2018). On the other
hand, rural banking policies have also been widely believed to be ineffective as the polit-
ical, rather than economic, considerations determine the flow of resources across sectors
and individuals, rendering the banking sector more susceptible to elite capture and even
undermine rural development (La Porta et al. 2002, Sapienza 2004). Despite its popular-
ity and these scepticisms, rural expansion policy has mostly escaped rigorous evaluation
regarding its effectiveness on financial access and poverty reduction. An exception is the
1Kenya in the 1970s, India in the 1970s, Bangladesh in the 1980s, Pakistan in the 2000s and Zambia in
the 2010s
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social banking intervention in India between 1977 and 1990. Burgess and Pande (2005)
find that the social banking expansion in rural India has reduced rural poverty during the
same period through a simultaneous expansion in credit disbursement to and saving mo-
bilization from the rural sector. On the other hand, using microdata, Kochar (2011) criti-
cizes that the rural banking expansion exacerbated consumption inequality as the benefit
has been captured mainly by the rich.
Pakistan has a long history of rural financing policies which cost billions of rupees,
however, she still remains one of the worst countries in terms of access to finance (State
Bank of Pakistan, 2004). This dilemma is believed to be linked to the concentration of
bank branches on urban areas. With bank branches being an important vehicle for de-
livering rural finance services and policies, e.g., subsidized credit for farmers and rural
enterprises, having an extensive branch network is critical to include Pakistan’s rural pop-
ulation, which make up 2/3 of the total population, into these services. Therefore, Pak-
istan has implemented the “Branch Expansion Policy (BEP)” reform since 2004 in the
hope of enhancing the rural outreach of bank branch network. Being one of the largest
interventions in the banking sector since its privatization in the 1990s, it is surprising that
no evaluation has been done. This paper fills this gap and seeks to add to the thin evidence
regarding the effectiveness of rural expansion policy on financial access and poverty re-
duction in the context of Pakistan. It also provides insights on Pakistan’s disappointing
status of financial inclusion.
In 2004, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Pakistan’s central bank, implemented the
BEP which mandated the banks with a network size of no less than 100 branches to open
20% of their new branches in “Rural and Underserved Areas (RUA)” which were vaguely
defined as “villages, small towns or unbanked tehsil headquarters”.2 This policy was
expanded to include all banks regardless of their network sizes effectively in 2007.
In this paper, I draw on several sources for the data in this analysis, including the State
Bank of Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, European Commission and the United
States National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Using bank-branch-level geographical
data, I track banks’ network expansion along the policy timeline. I establish the policy-
effect on the networks’ rural population coverage using a simple trend break model. On
an aggregate level, I identify the policy effects on branch accessibility, agricultural credit
2Pakistan has four levels of administrative division. They are, with descending order, province, district,
tehsil and union council.
45
disbursement and poverty by estimating a difference-in-differences trend break model,
which exploits the change in banks’ selection on less remote rural locations for their RUA
branches after the policy.
I find that the banks have complied with the policy by reserving 20% new branches
for RUA locations, but the bulk of new RUA branches are in less remote locations, i.e.,
locations that are closer to district capitals and more likely to have other branches within
5 kilometers radius, than RUA branches opened prior to the reform. As a result, the
policy failed to reach out to unbanked rural areas and the fraction of the country’s rural
population living within 5 kilometers radius of a bank branch (banked rural population)
stagnated at 57 percent. A counterfactual analysis reveals that the banked rural population
would have reached to 70 to 72 percent had the banks chosen locations with a higher
“Rural Market Potential (RMP)”, i.e., locations with a larger rural population per branch
or unbanked locations with a larger rural population.
Consistent with the actual branch-opening pattern, the aggregate level analysis shows
that the size of the RUA branch network has grown slower in districts with a larger rural
population share after the policy. In other words, the growth rate of RUA branch network
in a more rural district (e.g., “Lower Dir” whose rural population share is 97 percent)
was surpassed by the less rural one (e.g., “Karachi” whose rural population share is 7
percent) by 0.86 branches per million persons per year after the reform. This accounts
for an accumulative difference of 5.16 RUA branches per million persons between a more
and less rural district by 2012, a value that is 66% of the average RUA branches intensity
in 2000.
However, the number of borrowers and the amount of credit disbursed to agricultural
sector, a sector that dominates rural Pakistan, did not grow differently between a more
and less rural district in the wake of the reform. These results suggest that the policy
has failed to expand credit disbursement to the rural sector, consistent with the branch
network’s stagnant rural population coverage. Finally, poverty has also evolved in par-
allel between more and less rural districts along the policy timeline. I conclude that the
“Branch Expansion Policy” of Pakistan has failed to enhance the formal bank network’s
outreach to the rural population and reduce poverty because the new branches reserved
by the 20 percent quota were opened in less remote rural locations where a branch net-
work has already existed. More unfortunately, the reform has sharpened the geographical
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inequality in the number of RUA branches.
This study contributes to the literature on the importance of financial access in the
process of economic development, more specifically, the effectiveness of rural branch ex-
pansion policies. While branch expansion policy is popular in developing countries, only
the policy in India has received rigorous evaluations. Under India’s policy, which was in
effect between 1977 and 1990, banks, which had been nationalized in 1969, were required
to open four branches in “unbanked” locations for every one branch opened in a “banked”
location. Exploiting this rule, Burgess and Pande (2005) identify the poverty reduction
effect of the policy by estimating the reduction in poverty in unbanked states between
1977 and 1990 relative to other periods and compare this to the corresponding change in
poverty in banked states. They conclude that the expansion in banks resulted in a signif-
icant reduction in poverty through expanding credit provision to and saving mobilization
from the rural sector. Using a regression discontinuity design, Young (2017) evaluates
the policy that was revised in 2005 when the banks were required to open branches in
district with a “branch insufficiency” measure higher than the national average (measured
by population per branch) and finds that the policy has significantly increased the num-
ber of bank branches, bank accounts and crop yields in districts with baseline branch
insufficiency just above the threshold. On the other hand, this policy also received crit-
icism for its failure in reaching out to the ultra poor. Confining the analysis to the state
of Uttar Pradesh, Kochar (2011) exploits the variation in “unbankedness” at the district
level and find that the expansion of rural network under the India’s policy has increased
consumption inequality between households in the bottom and top quantile of the wealth
distribution.
I evaluate the Pakistan’s policy, which, to the best of my knowledge, has never been
evaluated before. While the policy is similar to the one in India, my study differs from
the studies in India in several important respects. First, in addition to using aggregate
level data, I use branch-level geographical data which allows me to precisely track the
branches’ geographical locations and the resulting population coverage over the years and
reveal the geographical inequality that is unobservable in aggregate data used in studies
on India’s policy. Second, Pakistan’s policy was implemented in a privatized banking
environment and thus reflects more closely South Asia today, where private sector banks
play an increasingly important role in the economy. Consistent with Burgess and Pande
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(2005) and Young (2017), my study reveals that the absence of a poverty reduction effect
was associated with a lack of credit expansion to the rural sector. In line with Kochar
(2011), I show that the inequality sharpening effect also existed on a more aggregate
level.
The results of this study also contribute to the broader debate on how best to deliver
credit to the poor (Pitt and Khandker 1998, Morduch 1999, Karlan and Zinman 2008,
Karlan and Morduch 2010, Banerjee et al. 2015c). Recent years have witnessed an ex-
plosion of microfinance institutions whose primary clientele are relatively poor farmers,
which is guided in part by the belief that traditional banks are ill suited for lending to
such households. While the number of studies that evaluate the ability of microfinance
institutions to cater to the poor is growing, these studies need to be augmented by others
that address the extent to which other banking institutions can also serve this objective.
This study serves this objective, evaluating the state-led policies that remain popular in
many low-income countries.
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the branching strategy adopted by
commercial banks. Without regulation on branches’ locations, commercial bank’s entry
and exit depend highly on the economic development of the location. Morgan et al. (2016)
show that commercial banks were more likely to exit from low- than high-income loca-
tions in the USA in response to the 2008 financial crisis. Studying a microfinance bank’s
expansion in South-East Europe, Brown et al. (2016) document that the bank tended to
enter rural locations with larger economic demands. Using a bank-country panel, Qi et al.
(2019) demonstrate that information sharing spurs banks to open branches in localities
that are new to them, but that are already well served by other banks. My study adds
to this strand of literature by showing that commercial banks adopt the same branching
strategy even under restrictions on branch openings. It demonstrates the need for more
carefully designed interventions for improving financial access than Pakistan’s arguably
naı¨ve branch expansion policy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, I provide back-
ground information on access to formal finance in rural Pakistan and the “Branch Ex-
pansion Policy” reform. Section 3.3 describes the data sources and how I structure them
for the analysis. Section 3.4 presents the evidence on banks’ compliance with the policy.
Section 3.5 discusses the empirical strategy and policy effect on the branch network’s ru-
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ral population coverage. Section 3.6 presents the empirical approach and policy effects
on credit disbursement and poverty. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and the Policy Reform
3.2.1 Access to Formal Finance in Pakistan
According to the Global Findex Database by the World Bank, Pakistan is ranked the
second to the bottom among the South Asian countries in terms of access to finance. In
2011, only 10% of Pakistani reported owning an account at a bank or another financial
institution. In comparison, the account owning population in India and Sri Lanka in 2011
was 40% and 70% respectively. In fact, the disappointing financial access situation in
Pakistan was not a recent incident but has persisted over the last six decades regardless
of a rich experience in the provision of rural financial services (State Bank of Pakistan,
2004).
Within Pakistan, there is sharp inequality in financial access between the rural and
urban sector. According to SBP’s banking statistics, while the rural population comprised
2/3 of the country’s population, they were served only by 1/5 of the bank branch network
in 2004. The absence of access to the bank network in rural Pakistan has resulted in the
following consequences. First, there is a dire lack of access to formal credit. According to
SBP’s Development Finance Review, the rural sector only accounted for 20% of the total
credit advance in terms of the number of transactions and 7% in terms of credit value.3
The farmers, the small and landless particularly, had to depend on informal sources for
meeting most of their credit requirements (State Bank of Pakistan, 2004). Although the
SBP has mandated banks to disburse targeted amount of credit to the agricultural sector,
a sector that dominates rural Pakistan, only 30% of the disbusement target has been met
in the decade of the 1990s (State Bank of Pakistan, 2000). This low fulfillment rate has
also assisted in charging of extremely high (50% to 100% annually) interest rates by the
informal agricultural credit providers from the needy farmers in every province of Pak-
istan (State Bank of Pakistan, 2001). The status is further saddened by the fact that the
majority of the agricultural credit has been captured by large farm owners and the num-
3The calculation is obtained by aggregating statistics from multiple reviews, which can be accessed via
http://www.sbp.org.pk/SME/DFG.htm
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ber of borrowers has stagnated at 15% farmers in the country (State Bank of Pakistan,
2004). Second, the rural sector is capable of mobilizing savings far and beyond what is
being captured by the formal sector at present. Past interventions like Rural Support Pro-
grammes have shown that whenever there were innovative or fresh saving products being
offered, the rural sector responded immediately and with fervor. The lack of relevant sav-
ing products in the rural sector has led the rural sector to concentrate its savings primarily
in the form of livestock (State Bank of Pakistan, 2001).
While a relatively lower demand may account for part of this low penetration of formal
banks in rural areas, one particular supply side factor, i.e., the banking culture, has been
frequently raised by the SBP. The culture of banking in Pakistan is highly urbanized and
industry-oriented. The owners, senior managers and other bank officers are uncomfortable
in rural settings (State Bank of Pakistan, 2001). The SBP believed that this banking
culture, when tailored properly to the rural setting, can be harnessed to include the rural
population into formal finance and attack the poverty in rural areas. Against this backdrop,
SBP has rolled out the reform in her “Branch Expansion Policy (BEP)” in two phases in
2004 and 2007 in order to enhance the outreach of the banking services to rural and
underserved areas of the country (BPD Circular No. 34 of 2004, BPRD Circular No. 15
of 2007).
3.2.2 The Branch Expansion Policy
The banking sector in Pakistan does not permit free entry of banking firms (Banking Com-
panies Ordinance 1962). New banking firms are granted entry infrequently by the SBP
through special campaigns with recent waves in the early 1990s following the privatiza-
tion of the banking sector. Banks must also acquire licenses prior to opening any branches
and receiving permissions to close or shift branches on an annual basis through the “An-
nual Branch Expansion Plan (ABEP)”, in which banks propose a set of branches to be
opened, closed and shifted over the next year. The SBP reviews the proposals centrally
and granted the set of licenses and permissions. There was no broad directive existed re-
garding the composition of markets served by the banks until the reform on the expansion
policy (henceforth, the “reform”) was introduced. The reform has changed this regulatory
environment in a fundamental way in that it required the banks to reserve 20 percent of
branch openings proposed in ABEP to locations termed as “Rural and Underserved Ar-
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eas (RUA)”, which were defined by the SBP as villages, small towns or unbanked tehsil
headquarters. It is noteworthy that this definition of RUA is rather vague for two reasons.
First, it is not consistent with the population census’s definition of rural locations, which
refers to locations that are neither within the boundary of a municipality nor cantonment.
While tehsils (cities) are clear municipalities and thus urban according to the census, it
is unclear whether a town or a village should be urban. Second, there is no quantifiable
threshold to justify a town to be large or small in the definition of RUA. Regarding the
policy rollout, in 2004, the first phase of the reform was rolled out and the 20 percent RUA
quota was only applied to banks with a branch network of no less than 100 branches. And
effectively since 2007, all banks regardless of their network size were subject to the RUA
quota.
Although the quota rule is similar to that from the India’s policy between 1977 and
1990 (Burgess and Pande, 2005), important differences exist and need to be discussed.
First, the quota in Pakistan’s reform is less demanding in that Pakistan’s quota was set
at 20 percent while India’s was at 80 percent. Second, the RUA locations under Pak-
istan’s policy are financially less backward than India’s. India’s policy coerced banks to
open branches in locations that were “unbanked”, while in Pakistan, these locations only
needed to be justified as “rural or underserved”. More importantly, unlike the India’s pol-
icy during which a list of unbanked locations was provided centrally by the central bank,
the SBP only provided a vague definition of RUA. This definition was not directly linked
to any banking statistics of the locations (except for the tehsil headquarter which would
be qualified as RUA if there was no bank branch existing within the tehsil headquarter
boundary). While it is clear to define a location as “unbanked” because the term provides
an implicit quantified threshold, it is less transparent to justify a location as RUA, espe-
cially when the SBP did not provide a clear quantifiable threshold. Therefore the banks
enjoyed a certain degree of freedom to claim the proposed location as RUA.
3.3 Data
This study uses both branch- and district-level data for the analysis. The branch-level data
is summarized in Table 3.1. First, from the SBP, I obtain a dataset which records each
bank branch that has ever existed between 2000 and 2012, the dates it was opened and
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closed, whether it was situated in a RUA location and the physical address of the location.
I exclude the branches opened in Azad Jammu and Kashmir as it is a disputed region
and not subject to the reform. In total, I have 11,293 branches. I geocode the branches’
physical addresses using the Google Maps Platform, which returns a pair of longitude and
latitude (i.e., geolocation) for each physical address queried to the platform. I also obtain
a layer of population raster data at 1 kilometer by 1 kilometer resolution covering the
whole Pakistan (excluding the dispute region) as shown in Figure 3.10. This population
raster data is estimated by the “Global Human Settlement” dataset from the European
Commission using the 1998 Pakistan Population Census. I map out the rural and urban
regions by calibrating the rural population share to the share reported by the population
census. The calibration is done at the district level and the detailed procedure is described
in Appendix 3.B. I only use the population data of 1998 as a basis for any population
related measures used in my analysis because the most recent population census prior
to the reform was in 1998 and the subsequent census was in 2017 which is beyond my
analysis timeline. Based on the branches’ geolocations and the population raster data, I
then calculate, for each branch, the distance to the district’s capital city and the rural and
urban population coverage within 5 kilometers radius buffer. The detailed calculation for
population coverage is demonstrated in Panel A and B of Figure 3.3.
Second, I obtain a list of populated locations of Pakistan from the “NGA Gazetteer”
database by the United States National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). For Pak-
istan, “NGA Gazetteer” offers 122,654 populated locations, of which 116,945 fall within
the boundary of my calibrated rural region. These 116,945 populated rural locations are
then used in a counterfactual analysis in which they serve as alternative candidates for
the RUA branches opened after the reform. For each location, I also calculate the set of
geospatial statistics mentioned above. The ideal case would be to use the list of locations
identified by the Pakistan Population Census. Unfortunately, such data is not available.
Therefore, I resort to the “NGA Gazetteer”. Nevertheless, the locations from the “NGA
Gazetteer” trace the populated settlements of Pakistan quite accurately as we can visu-
ally inspected in Figure 3.1, which overlays a sample of these locations identified by the
“NGA Gazetteer” (blue dots) on a satellite image of the corresponding region.
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Note: The blue dots represent a sample of populated locations identified by the “NGA Gazetteer”. Over-
laying these dots on a satellite image of the corresponding region, the settlements features of the satellite
image are very accurately located by the blue dots.
Figure 3.1: Populated Locations Identified by “NGA”
I also compile from various sources a district-year panel whose variables of interest
include the following. The “rural population share” of a district is obtained from the 1998
population census to measure the degree of urbanization of a district. The “number of
RUA branches per million persons” is aggregated from the branch data to measure the
bank network’s rural outreach in a district.4 From the SBP’s Agricultural Credit and Mi-
crofinance Department, I collect a set of agricultural credit disbursement measures for the
period between 2007 and 2012 with annual frequency. The SBP categorizes the agricul-
tural credit into crop and non-crop credit.5 For each category, the “number of borrowers”
and the “amount of disbursement” are reported. I standardize these variables to per capi-
tal term by the district-specific population. Finally, I use the ”Multi-dimensional Poverty
Index (MPI)” from UNDP (2016), which comprises three dimensions, namely education,
health and standards of living, and are further segregated into 15 indicators. The MPI is
a weighted average of these 15 indicators and its value ranges between 0 and 1. A higher
MPI indicates more sever poverty. The MPI data covers the period between 2004 and
2012 and is available only at biannual frequency because the household survey used to
4This is similar to the “social banking” measure in Burgess and Pande (2005).
5Non-crop items include livestock, poultry, dairy farming, fishery and forestry.
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estimate the MPI is conducted biannually.6 This district-year panel is separated into pre-
and post-2007 sample and summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Bank Branches and Locations
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Bank Branches from SBP
Is a RUA Branch 11,293 0.22 0.42
RUA Branches
Rural Population in 5km Radius 2,517 44,116 40,278
Urban Population in 5km Radius 2,517 68,708 191,023
Distance to district capital (km) 2,517 22 15
Non-RUA Branches
Rural Population in 5km Radius 8,776 44,695 55,558
Urban Population in 5km Radius 8,776 652,857 633,041
Distance to district capital (km) 8,776 10 13
Rural Locations from “NGA Gazetteer”
Rural Population in 5km Radius 116,945 19,022 26,011
Urban Population in 5km Radius 116,945 8,089 37,744
Distance to district capital (km) 116,945 32 22
Note: The branch-level sample consists of 11,293 bank branches that have ever existed between 2000 and
2012, excluding those located in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The location-level sample consists of 116,945
rural populated locations that are identified in “NGA Gazetteer”. The population is counted based on the
1998 population census. The urban and rural decomposition is based on the author’s calibration, whose
detailed process in explained in Appendix 3.B. According to the 1998 population census, the size of rural
and urban population is 89 and 43 million, respectively.
6UNDP (2016) calculate the MPI using data from “Pakistan Social and Living Standard Survey (PSLM)
- District-Level Survey” which is conducted biannually with the first wave initiated in 2004.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of District-level Variables
2000-2006 2007-2012
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Rural Population Share 854 0.77 0.17 734 0.77 0.17
RUA Branch per Million Persons 854 8.49 7.54 734 10.46 8.38
Poverty (Biannually from 2004 to 2012)
MPI 244 0.37 0.14 366 0.32 0.15
Agricultural Credit Disbursement (by credit category) in:
Rupees per capita
Aggregate 734 319 418
Crop 734 248 323
Non-crop 734 70 221
Borrowers per million persons
Aggregate 734 2,295 3,517
Crop 734 2,027 3,239
Non-crop 734 268 477
Note: An observation is a district. Except for MPI, data is collected on an annual basis. This panel consists
of 122 districts, excluding those located in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Non-crop items include livestock,
poultry, dairy farming, fishery and forestry.
3.4 Evidence on Policy Compliance
I start by providing evidence that the banks have complied with the reform and signifi-
cantly increased the size of their RUA branch network. The most direct evidence comes
from the changes in the share of new branches opened in RUA locations along the policy
timeline as shown in the upper panel of Figure 3.2. New branches refer to the branches
that were opened in the calendar year of consideration. The two vertical dashed lines refer
to the years since which the two reform phases have been in effect. The two dashed lines
with markers trace out the cases for big and small banks respectively. As it is shown, the
two groups of banks have clearly complied with the quota since 2004 and 2007 by discon-
tinuously increasing the share of branches opened in RUA locations to 20 percent. The
small banks did not meet the quota instantly in 2007 when they also became subjected to
the reform. The reason, as I suspect, is that some small banks were given a grace period
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in adjusting their annual branch expansion plan on a case by case basis, a measure that
is not uncommon to SBP in fostering small companies.7 Nevertheless, the small banks
have caught up with the quota since 2008. While it is true that multiple confounders, e.g.,
increase of economic demands in rural areas, can also cause expansion of RUA network,
it is unlikely that these factors can explain the two discontinuous changes to exactly 20
percent in 2004 and 2007 respectively. In comparison, this share is rather low at around
2 percent before 2004. In other words, there was almost no new branch opened in RUA
locations before the reform. For this fact, it is safe to claim that the policy reform drove
the expansion of the RUA network. This also suggests that the reform has distorted the
banks’ optimal geographical allocation of new branches. The solid line traces out the case
when aggregating the two bank groups. Again, a clear discontinuous change is present
in 2004 and slowly converges to 20 percent after 2007. The discontinuity in 2007 is less
visible because the share of small banks is relative small.
The change in the spatial composition of new branches has also affected the stock of
RUA branches. This can be observed in the bottom panel of Figure 3.2. The discontinuous
increase in the share of new RUA branches in 2004 and 2007 is reflected as faster growth
in the stock of RUA branches starting in 2003 and 2006, i.e., the two “kinks” in 2003
and 2006 in the bottom panel. This provides a ground for my identification strategy.
Intuitively, if the RUA branches are effective in delivering the policy effects, we should
expect changes in the growth of the outcome variables in 2003 and 2006, a pattern that is
consistent with the bottom panel of Figure 3.2.
7For example, at the beginning of the banking sector privatization in 1995, the opening of new branches
by the new banks was eased (State Bank of Pakistan, 2000). In recent years, SBP has offered one year of
grace period to loans borrowed by new companies (IH&SMEFD Circular Letter No. 09 of 2014).
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Note: “big” refers to the group of banks whose branch network was no smaller than 100 branches in 2003.
“small” is the complementary group. “aggregate” refers to the case including all banks.
Figure 3.2: Branches Opened in RUA Locations
3.5 Effects on the Rural Outreach
Empirical Approach
Although the number of RUA branches has expanded massively after the reform, the
number of branches does not solely determine the extent of financial access. The loca-
tion of this RUA network also plays an important role. A literature has established that a
closer geographical proximity to a bank branch significantly increases the take-up of bank
services (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Degryse and Ongena 2005, Agarwal and Hauswald
2010, Brevoort et al. 2012). This is still true in the US today, where information technol-
ogy has significantly reduced the cost imposed by geographical barrier (Nguyen, 2019).
To account for the influence of the branch locations, I use an extensive margin measure of
access to finance. This measure is termed as “Branch Network’s Rural Outreach (BNRO)”
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and is defined as follow,
BNROt = (
Bt⋃
b=1
RPOP5KMbt)/RPOP
where RPOP5KMbt refers to the set of rural population residing within 5 kilometers ra-
dius of the branch b of year t (banked rural population). The 5 kilometers threshold is
officially used by the SBP to capture a branch’s coverage extent. RPOP is the total rural
population in 1998, which is a constant equal to 89 million. Bt denotes to the branch
stock in year t. BNROt is calculated by taking the union of RPOP5KMbt over all branches
that are operating in year t and it is normalized by the size of total rural population in
1998. Intuitively, BNROt captures the share of banked rural population in year t in the
total rural population. Notice that this measure assumes zero population migration across
years and is based on the distribution of rural population which is decomposed from the
total population distribution in 1998. A detailed decomposition procedure is provided in
Appendix 3.B. The definition of BNRO is visualized in Figure 3.3. BNROt avoids dou-
ble counting the set of population that are covered by multiple branches. In comparison,
the intensive margin measure, i.e., branches per capita in a state as used by other studies
would not capture the geographical variation within the state (i.e., in Burgess and Pande
2005, Kochar 2011, Young 2017).
0
1
2
3
Panel A: RPOP Panel B: RPOP5KMbt Panel C:
Bt⋃
b=1
RPOP5KMbt
Note: The dashed line in all panels circles out the border of a sample region. Panel A shows the rural
population density distribution at 1km by 1km resolution. The unit of the population is in 1000 persons.
The sum of the grids’ values gives the size of rural population. The triangles represent the locations of
branches. Panel B represents the set of rural population residing within 5km radius of a branch. Panel C
displays the union of the rural population sets associated with all three branches. BNRO is obtained by
dividing the size of rural population included in Panel C by the size of the total rural population circled out
in Panel A.
Figure 3.3: Conceptualization of “Branch Network Rural Outreach (BNRO)”
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To test whether BNROt displays a similar growth pattern as in the bottom panel of
Figure 3.2, i.e., whether BNROt grows faster after 2003 and 2006, I estimate the following
simple linear trend break model,
BNROt = c+β0 ∗ (t−2000)+β1 ∗ (t−2003)∗D2003t +β2 ∗ (t−2006)∗D2006t (3.1)
+λ1 ∗D2003t +λ2 ∗D2003t +ut
where c is the constant term. t denotes the year. D2003t is a dummy variable that equals
1 if year t is 2003 or beyond, and 0 otherwise. The post-2006 dummy variable, D2006t , is
similarly defined. ut is the error term. Intuitively, model (3.1) breaks the time series of
BNROt into three sections at year 2003 and 2006 and fits a line to each section, allowing
for intercept changes at the breaking points. Precisely, λ1 and λ2 estimate the intercept
changes in 2003 and 2006. The slopes of the fitted lines for the three sections, i.e., [2000,
2003), [2003, 2006) and [2006, 2012], are β0, β0 + β1 and β0 + β1 + β2, respectively.
Therefore, my coefficients of interests are β1 and β2, which capture the changes of the
growth rate of BNROt (relative to the pre-2003 period) at the year point 2003 and 2006,
respectively.
Results
The results are presented in Table 3.3 where the second and third row show the estimates
of β1 and β2 respectively. First, to confirm the existence of the kinks in the pattern of
the bottom panel in Figure 3.2, I estimate model (3.1) with the left-hand side variable
replaced by the number of RUA branches in year t and report the estimation in column
(1). Before 2003, the stock of RUA branches decreased by around 19 branches per year.
Consistent with the visual inspection of Figure 3.2, there two significant trend breaks in
2003 and 2006, respectively, suggesting that the growth of the number of RUA branches
accelerated by 43 and 68 branches per year from 2003 and 2006, respectively, compared to
the pre-reform period. The acceleration accumulated to a total increase of 1176 branches
by the year of 2012, a value that is 73% of the total RUA branches in 2000.8
Column (2) shows the estimate for BNROt . The point estimate of β0 is only nominal at
0.08 branches per million persons per year, suggesting that the network’s rural population
8There are 9 years posterior to the reform from 2004 to 2012, with 3 years in the first phase and 6 in the
second. 1176 = 43*3 + 68*6. The total number of RUA branches in 2000 is 1610.
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coverage, i.e., the fraction of banked rural population in the total rural population, stayed
almost stagnant during the pre-2003 period. The size of RUA network even saw a slight
shrinkage at 0.06 branches per million persons per year after 2003 when the number of
RUA branches started to grow. Finally, I detect a statistically significant trend break in
2006. Between 2006 and 2012, the rural population coverage grew faster than pre-2003
period by 0.2 percentage points per year. However, it is particularly noteworthy that the
magnitude of this increase in growth is also nominal. According to this estimate, the total
improvement in the rural outreach only adds up to 1.2 percentage points by 2012, a value
that is only 2% of the value in 2000 to be precise.9 In Figure 3.5, the solid line with
circular marker traces the values of BNROt between 2000 and 2012, depicting an overall
flat growth trend of BNROt with a slight acceleration in 2006, a pattern that is consistent
with the estimates in column (2) of Table 3.3. Overall, there is a lack of growth in branch
network’s rural population outreach. In the appendix 3.A, I discuss the robustness of these
findings.
Table 3.3: Effect on Branch Network Rural Outreach (BNRO)
Dependent Variable: Number of RUA Branches BNRO (%)
Actual Counterfactual.1 Counterfactual.2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β0: [2000-2003) trend −19.50∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(6.54) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
β1: [2003-2006) trend 43.00∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗
*Post-2003 dummy (9.25) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06)
β2: [2006-2012] trend 67.79∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
*Post-2006 dummy (6.77) (0.02) (0.12) (0.12)
λ1: Intercept change in 2003 8.83 −0.004 0.06 0.05
(16.47) (0.05) (0.11) (0.09)
λ2: Intercept change in 2006 3.81 −0.01 0.33 0.75
(15.48) (0.07) (0.46) (0.43)
Constant 1,607.50∗∗∗ 55.46∗∗∗ 55.46∗∗∗ 55.46∗∗∗
(8.45) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 13 13 13 13
Adjusted R2 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
Note: Standard errors are clustered by year and reported in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
91.2 percentage points = 0.2 percentage points per year * 6 years. BNRO2000 = 55.7 percentage points
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Taken together, an economically significant improvement in the size of RUA branch
network (76%) with a stagnant growth in the branch network rural outreach (2%) sug-
gest that the locations chosen by the banks to fulfil the quota were not the most remote.
This is a valid concern, since, as argued previously, the policy reform was costly to the
banks because it distorted their optimal geographical allocation of branches. The banks
thus have incentives to reduce the cost. Given the lack of rigor in the definition of RUA
locations, a convenient way for the banks to reduce the cost imposed by the policy was to
choose less remote locations for the new branches reserved by the quota, assuming that
opening a branch in a less remote location is less costly to a bank. The banks’ reluctance
to expand their networks to remote locations are also documented in numerous studies
(Morgan et al. 2016, Brown et al. 2016, Qi et al. 2019, Young 2017).
To test this hypothesis, I use a sample that contains all new RUA branches opened
between 2000 and 2012. Two measures of “remoteness” are calculated for each new
branch. The first measure is whether the RUA branch is “Opened in a Banked Location
(BANKEDdt)”. Precisely, BANKEDdt is a binary variable that equals 1 if the RUA branch
of district d that was newly opened in year t is located in a location, within 5 kilometers
of which, at least one other bank branch exists up to year t− 1. The second measure is
the RUA branch’s “Distance to the District Capital (DISTdt)”.
I am interested in tracing the average “remoteness” of the new RUA branches along
the policy timeline. However year-by-year comparison is not permissible due to the low
yearly incidence of RUA branch openings before the reform. Therefore, each new branch
is grouped into one of the three period-groups based on the year of opening, namely
[2000, 2004), [2004, 2007) and [2007, 2012] which represent the periods of pre-reform,
reform-phase-1 and reform-phase-2. The averages of the group [2004, 2007) and [2007,
2012] are then compared against the pre-reform group using the following model,
ydt = c+µ1 ∗D[2004,2007)t +µ2 ∗D[2007,2012]t +udt (3.2)
where ydt is one of the two “remoteness” measures of district d in year t. D
[2004,2007)
t is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the year t is in period [2004, 2007) and 0 otherwise.
D[2007,2012]t follows a similar definition for period [2007, 2012]. udt is the error term.
Intuitively, the constant term gives the estimate of the mean of y for the pre-reform period
[2000, 2004). µ1 captures the difference in average between [2004, 2007) and the pre-
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reform period. Finally, µ2 captures the difference in average between [2007, 2012] and
the pre-reform period.
The results are presented in Table 3.4. Confirming my hypothesis, the RUA locations
the banks chose after the reform are less remote than those chosen before the reform. Pre-
cisely, column (1) shows that 40% of the RUA branches opened were in banked locations
between 2000 and 2004. During the phase-1 and phase-2 reform, this fraction witnessed
a 50 and 53 percentage points increase, accumulating to an impressive total of 90 and
93%, respectively. This suggests that almost all RUA branches opened after the reform
were in banked locations. Similarly, in terms of distance to district capitals, column (2)
suggests that RUA branches opened during phase-1 and phase-2 period were 7 and 10
kilometers closer to the district capitals, compared to those opened during the pre-reform
period. These results are consistent with the literature on commercial banks’ branching
strategy and support the claim that the reform has failed to improve the branch network’s
rural outreach.
Table 3.4: Remoteness of the RUA Branches Opened Between 2000 and 2012
Dependent Variable: Opened in a Banked Location Distance to District Capital (km)
(1) (2)
Constant 0.400∗ 29.642∗∗∗
(0.221) (2.680)
D[2004,2007)t 0.501∗∗ −7.170∗∗
(0.227) (3.439)
D[2007,2012)t 0.527∗∗ −9.754∗∗∗
(0.221) (2.858)
Observations 646 646
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.003
Note: The unit of observation is a RUA branch. The sample consists of all RUA branches that were opened
between 2000 and 2012. This analysis cannot be extended before 2000 because the records of branch
openings are not complete before 2000. Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Counterfactual Analysis
Overall, the reform has limited success in expanding the outreach to the rural population
(BNROt) because the chosen locations for the RUA branch network are on the fringes
of urban centers where a branch network already existed (as implied by Table 3.4). In
this section, I address the question on how the rural outreach would appear had the banks
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instead chosen the RUA locations based on “rural market potential (RMP)”. I construct
two counterfactual RUA networks based on two measures of RMP as benchmarks to
further judge the economic significance of the actual expansion.
The counterfactual RUA network is constructed by reallocating the 681 new RUA
branches that have been opened between 2004 and 2012 (i.e., after the reform). The
pool of alternative locations contains 116,945 populated rural locations from the “NGA
Gazetteer”. The reallocation is done dynamically on an annual basis. To reallocate the
new RUA branches opened in year t, I rank the alternative locations by their rural market
potential of year t-1 and choose the alternative locations based on this ranking. The loca-
tions’ rankings are then updated and forms the basis for the reallocation of year t+1. This
counterfactual thus tells us where and when new RUA branches would have been opened
if the banks were maximizing rural market potential. Two measures of rural market po-
tential are used to construct two separate counterfactual networks. They are defined as
follow.
The first measure, RMPAr,t , captures the size of rural population a branch can serve at
the location r and year t, had a branch entered that location,
RMPAr,t =
RPOP5KMr
Branch5KMr,t−1+1
where RPOP5KMr is the size of rural population (of year 1998) residing within 5 kilome-
ters radius of the location r. Branch5KMr,t−1 refers to the number of branches operating
within 5 kilometers radius of the location r in year t-1. An additional value 1 is added to
the denominator to capture the scenario of “if a branch entered the location r”.
The second measure, RMPBr,t , captures the size of unbanked rural population a branch
can serve at the location r and year t, had the branch been opened there,
RMPBr,t = RPOP5KMr ∗Unbanked5KMr,t−1
where Unbanked5KMr,t−1 is a binary variable that equals 1 if there is no branch operat-
ing within 5 kilometers radius of the location r in year t-1. It is noteworthy that RMPBr,t is
equal to censoring RMPAr,t byUnbanked5KMr,t−1, i.e., RMPBr,t prioritizes the unbanked lo-
cations, therefore, its corresponding counterfactual network will reach out to more remote
areas than RMPAr,t .
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The actual and the two counterfactual networks of the RUA branches opened between
2004 and 2012 are presented in Figure 3.4. The white and black regions in the base
map represent the calibrated urban and rural areas respectively. The blue dots repre-
sent the locations of the branches. The actual case (i.e., left panel) shows that the new
RUA branches heavily trace the urban centers while in the two counterfactual cases, these
branches mostly fill the gaps between the urban centers. The starkest contrast is visible
along the corridor of Peshawar-Islamabad-Rawalpindi-Gujranwala-Lahore (the northeast
corner of the map), a region that contains only 6% of the rural population in Pakistan
while this percentage is 23% for urban population. To make the comparison more visible,
the bottom panel zooms in to the region near Peshawar. This observation shows, from
another perspective, the banks reluctance to enter more rural areas. In Figure 3.5, I plot
the rural outreach (i.e., BNROt) of these two counterfactual (solid lines with square and
triangular markers) and the actual (solid line with circular markers) networks between
2000 and 2012. The contrast is stark. First of all, the period between 2000 and 2003 are
excluded from my counterfactual simulation because the reform was initiated in 2004. As
a result, the growth of rural outreach in the three cases are indistinguishable until 2003.
Second, two kinks can be clearly observed in the year 2003 and 2006 in both counterfac-
tual cases, which, in comparison, are visually absent for the actual case. This is confirmed
by the estimation of model (3.1) using the simulated data of the two counterfactual cases.
The results are reported in column (3) and (4) of Table 3.3.
Column (3) indicates that, under the first counterfactual network, BNROt witnesses a
growth acceleration by 1.08 and 0.64 percentage points per year in phase-1 and phase-2
reform period, respectively, compared to the pre-reform period. The acceleration is even
higher under the second counterfactual network as shown in column (4) because the sec-
ond counterfactual network prioritizes the unbanked locations. In comparison, the growth
of BNROt under the actual network is only nominal (column 2), at 0.2 percentage point
per year after 2006, a value that is only a third of the estimate under the first counterfac-
tual network (column 3), or a quarter under the second counterfactual case (column 4).
These differences are also statistically significant at 1% level.10
More importantly, these estimates suggest that the improvement in the share of banked
rural population in the total rural population by 2012 under the two counterfactual cases
10A test for the null hypothesis of “βCounter f actual.12 − βActual2 = 0” shows a p-value of 0.002. And the
p-value is 7.16∗10−5 for the null hypothesis “βCounter f actual.22 −βActual2 = 0”
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Actual Counterfactual.1 Counterfactual.2
Actual: Zoom Counterfactual.1: Zoom Counterfactual.2: Zoom
RUA Branch
Note: The “blue” dots refer to the RUA branches. The “black” region refers to the rural areas identified by
calibrating the rural population share to fit the one reported in the census. The calibration process is provided
in Appendix 3.B. The “white” region refer to the urban areas. “Counterfactual.1” and “Counterfactual.2”
present the counterfactual network based on the rural market potential measures of RMPAr,t and RMP
B
r,t ,
respectively.
Figure 3.4: RUA Branches Opened Between 2004 and 2012
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are ten times larger than that under the actual case. More precisely, the share of banked
rural population reaches to 70 and 72 percent in the first and second counterfactual net-
work, respectively, an improvement of 15 and 17 percentage points from the year 2000.
In comparison, the rural outreach under the actual network has mainly stagnated, with a
nominal 1.6 percentage points improvement since 2000. This stark comparison strongly
demonstrates the reform’s failure in terms of rural outreach enhancement.
Note: “Counterfactual.1” and “Counterfactual.2” present the counterfactual RUA network for the year 2012
based on maximizing the rural market potential measures of RMPAr,t and RMP
B
r,t , respectively.
Figure 3.5: Branch Network’s Rural Outreach
3.6 Effects on Agricultural Credit Disbursement and Poverty
Empirical Approach
The answer to the question on whether government interventions of financial access ex-
pansion is effective in reducing poverty is inconclusive in the literature. On the one hand,
Burgess and Pande (2005) and Young (2017) have found consistent evidence that better
financial development reduces poverty by relaxing the credit and saving constraints faced
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by the poor. On the other hand, La Porta et al. (2002) and Sapienza (2004) argue that
market frictions and political considerations, especially in low income countries, distort
the allocation of financial resources, preventing the poor from benefiting from financial
development. This argument is supported by Kochar (2011) who shows that consumption
inequality sharpened in response to the rural expansion of bank network in India.
Using the simple trend break model, i.e., model (3.1), to identify the policy effects on
credit disbursement and poverty, as compared to population coverage, is more challeng-
ing because cross-sectional and temporal variations in economic factors (e.g., interest
rate) could also affect the trend pattern that could potentially appear in credit disburse-
ment and poverty. For example, a faster growth of credit disbursement after the reform
could also be explained by a ceteris paribus decrease of interest rate. Moreover, the model
does not account for cross-sectional variation. Therefore, it is not immediately clear that
the locations where credit disbursement grew are the locations that benefited from hav-
ing more RUA branches after the reform. Therefore, to reduce these biases, I employ a
difference-in-differences trend break model, exploring the temporal and cross-sectional
variations induced by the policy.
The underlying assumption is that more remote locations offer less profitable business
opportunities for banks and therefore, in the absence of the reform, would attract less
new branches and witness a smaller growth in the branch stock. The previous finding
suggests that banks opened even less branches in more remote locations after the reform,
suggesting that if the reform had any bite, its rollout should have sharpened the correla-
tion between more remoteness of a location and smaller number of RUA branches. To
examine this possibility I run the following difference-in-differences regression model
using a district-year panel dataset. I conduct this analysis using district-level observations
because credit and poverty data are available only at the district level.
Yd,t =
2014
∑
τ=2002
γτ ∗Yd,2000 ∗Dτt +
2014
∑
τ=2002
βτ ∗RuralPopShared ∗Dτt +ηt+σd+udt (3.3)
where Yd,t is the outcome variable of district d and year t. Dτt are year dummies that take
value 1 if year t equals τ . Yd,2000 is the outcome Y’s value in year 2000 (baseline value)
and it is interacted with the year dummies to control for the time-trend specific to the
baseline value. ηt and σd are the year and district fixed effects. RuralPopShared is a
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proxy of district d’s remoteness, measured by the rural population share of the district d
in year 1998. This variable enters the regression interacted with year dummies, with βτ
denoting the year-specific coefficients. The difference between βτ+1 and βτ tells us how
a district’s initial rural population share affected RUA branch growth between years τ and
τ+1.
I am interested in testing whether the growth of βτ changes after 2007 when all banks
became subjected to the reform. This is achieved by estimating a difference-in-differences
trend break model following Burgess and Pande (2005),
Yd,t = β0 ∗RuralPopShared ∗ (t−2000) (3.4)
+β1 ∗RuralPopShared ∗ (t−2006)∗D2006t
+λ1 ∗RuralPopShared ∗D2006t +
2012
∑
τ=2002
γτ ∗Dτt ∗Yd,2000+ηt+σd+udt
Intuitively, model (3.4) breaks the series of βτ estimated from model (3.3) into two sec-
tions at year 2006 and fits a line to each of the two sections, allowing for intercept changes.
Precisely, the slopes of the fitted lines for the periods, [2001, 2006] and (2006, 2012] are,
respectively, β0 and β0 + β1. I am interested in testing whether the slope changes, i.e.,
whether β1 is significantly different from zero. Finally, λ1 measures the intercept changes
in this relationship in 2006. Ideally, I would like to test the trend break in year 2003 which
is associated with the imposition of the reform’s first phase. However, credit and poverty
data are available only from 2004.
Results
I start by presenting the results on the cumulative number of RUA branches per million
person. The dots in Figure 3.6 graph the estimates of βτ coefficients from model (3.3)
(the reference year is 2001). As it is shown, up until 2006, the trend stayed mostly flat,
indicating that the banks did not change their preference for less rural districts for opening
RUA branches. A trend break (i.e., a “kink”) appeared in 2006 when the reform was rolled
out to all banks. Precisely, the βτ coefficients decrease with time after 2006, i.e., more
rural districts (i.e., districts with larger rural population share) witness smaller growth
of number of branches in RUA locations. In other words, the banks preferred less rural
districts to a greater extent than they did before the reform.
The existence of the trend break is confirmed by estimating model (3.4). As shown in
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column (1) of Table 3.5, between 2001 and 2006, a rural district, e.g., “Lower Dir” whose
rural population share equals almost 1, compared to an urban district, e.g., “Karachi”
whose rural population share equals almost 0, experienced less growth in number of RUA
branches per million persons by 0.01 annually. The slope of the trend decreases signif-
icantly after 2006 by 0.86 (i.e., the slope after 2006 is -0.87), a magnitude that is equal
to 11% of the average stock of RUA branch at baseline. This implies that by the year of
2012 the gap between “Lower Dir” and “Karachi” in terms of RUA branch network size
would be widened by 5.61 branches per million population, a value that is 66% of the
average RUA branch network size in 2000. The blue lines in Figure 3.6 are fitted based
on these estimates. These results confirm that the majority of the RUA branch openings
after the reform was captured by the less rural districts.
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Figure 3.6: Rural Population Share and RUA Branch Expansion
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Table 3.5: Effects on Financial Inclusion and Poverty
Dependent Variable: Outreach Agricultural Credit Poverty
Aggregate Crop Non-crop
RUA Borrowers Rupees Borrowers Rupees Borrowers Rupees MPI
branches per per per per per per
per mil. pop. mil. pop capita mil. pop capita mil. pop capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
λ1 −0.93∗∗
(0.47)
β0 −0.01 0.016
(0.07) (0.013)
β1 −0.86∗∗ 119.31 −57.96 188.01 23.02 −68.71 −80.99∗ −0.017
(0.36) (281.96) (54.24) (263.29) (32.05) (57.16) (42.09) (0.013)
Joint F-test 5.96 0.026
[0.02] [0.872]
Mean in 2007 1807 267 1685 227 121 41
Observations 1,588 734 734 734 734 734 734 610
Adjusted R2 0.98 0.67 0.86 0.64 0.86 0.54 0.82 0.92
Note: Standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses. p-values are in square brackets. Joint
F-test is the joint significance test for the two β coefficients in the second and third rows.
As highlighted by Burgess and Pande (2005) and Young (2017), the rural branch ex-
pansion in India was successful in reducing poverty because the rural branches simul-
taneously provided more credit to and mobilized more deposit from the rural sector. In
rural Pakistan, the production activities are predominantly agricultural and the credit mar-
kets, as in other developing countries, are characterized by the co-existence of formal
and informal lenders. While the main source of credit of rural households in Pakistan is
from informal market, e.g., friends and relatives, formal credit explains one-third of rural
credit (Faruqee et al., 1996). These formal loans are mainly provided by banks which
are mandated to disburse a targeted amount of credit to agricultural sector on an annual
basis (“agricultural credit”). Despite its limited role, past studies have clearly highlighted
the importance of formal credit in Pakistan. Zuberi (1989) finds that 70 percent of to-
tal institutional credit is used for the purchase of seed and fertilizer, and concludes that
most of the increases in agricultural output can be explained by changes in the amount
of seed and fertilizer expenditure. Malik et al. (1991) attempt to provide evidence for
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the role of institutional credit in agricultural production. Similarly, their results show
that institutional credit is an important determinant of fertilizer and seed expenditure. In
comparison, informal loans are mainly short-term consumption loans, and arguably, it has
no impacts for rural growth which requires long-term productive investment (Khandker
and Faruqee, 2003). In light of the aforementioned literature, I test whether the reform
has caused expansion in agricultural credit disbursement.11 The underlying assumption
is that, if the RUA branches are successful in delivering agricultural credit, then a larger
number of RUA branches correlate to a larger size of agricultural credit disbursement in
a district. Therefore, the evolution of the correlations between district’s remoteness and
size of agricultural credit disbursement along the years follows the same pattern as Fig-
ure 3.6. With credit disbursement data available only from 2007, I restrict my analysis
to estimating the slope of the post-2007 trend of the series of correlations between dis-
trict’s rural population share and credit disbursement in a district. Therefore, the results
on the credit disbursement should be taken with a grain of salt. The slope of the trend is
estimated using a modified version of model (3.4), which is specified as follow.
Yd,t = β1 ∗RuralPopShared ∗ (t−2007)+
2012
∑
τ=2007
γτ ∗Dτt ∗Yd,2007+ηt+σd+udt (3.5)
where Yd,t denotes the one of the agricultural credit disbursement variables in district d
and year t. β1 is the slope of our interest. The hypothesis is that, if the RUA branches had
succeeded in delivering credit to the rural sector after the reform, we should expect to see
a slower growth of credit disbursement in a more than less rural district, as a more rural
district received less RUA branch openings after the reform. This would be reflected by a
negative β1.
Two types of agricultural credit are separately reported, namely, crop and non-crop
credit. Non-crop items include livestock, poultry, dairy farming, fishery and forestry.
For each credit category, two disbursement variables are collected and analyzed, namely,
the number of borrowers (borrowers per million people) and the total disbursed credit
amount (rupee per capita). Crop-farming is the main driver for the growth of agricultural
sector in Pakistan, accounting for around 89% of the total agricultural GDP (Rehman
et al., 2017). Its importance is also reflected in its major share of agricultural credit
11Data on deposit is not compiled at district level by SBP, therefore I could not evaluate the impact on it.
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disbursement. Precisely, crop credit makes up 74% and 94% in loan volume and number
of borrowers, respectively, of the total agricultural credit (State Bank of Pakistan, 2007).
In comparison, non-crop farming plays only a minimal role in contributing to agricultural
sector growth.
Applying model (3.5) to the credit variables, the results reported in column (2) to
(7) of Table 3.5 and visualized in Figure 3.7. First of all, the point estimates of the
aggregate number of borrowers (column 2) is positive, contradicting to the hypothesis. It
may suggest that the number of borrowers grew faster in a more, compared to a less, rural
district even though the less rural district captures the majority of RUA branch openings.
However, the point estimate is imprecisely estimated with a large standard error equal to
230% of the size of point estimate. It is unlikely that ceteris paribus increasing the sample
size to the level of the branch outreach variable (column 1) would reduce its standard error
to a level that is small enough to show statistical significance. The point estimate of the
aggregate amount of agricultural credit disbursement (column 3), although statistically
insignificant, is indeed negative, indicating that the amount of agricultural credit grows
slower in a more than less rural district by Rs.58 per capita per year, a value that is 22%
of the average credit amount in 2007. This is thus large in proportion to average credit
amount, but it is only 0.7% of Pakistan’s poverty line in 2007.12 Reducing the agricultural
credit by Rs.58 per capita per year (column 6) in a more, relative to a less, rural district is
unlikely to change the gap in economic welfare between these two districts on an annual
basis. In comparison, India’s policy has caused an expansion of rural credit volume in per
capita per annum term by approximately 7% of India’s poverty line at the time according
to Burgess and Pande (2005), an expansion that is 10 times the size of Pakistan’s.13
Disaggregating the credit variables by credit types, the results are presented in col-
umn (4) to (7). For crop credit, which makes up the majority of agricultural credit, both
the number of borrowers (column 4) and the amount (column 5) display upward trends,
indicating that the crop credit disbursement grows faster in a more than less rural district.
This observation would imply that the policy benefits the more rural districts in terms
12Pakistan’s poverty line in 2007 was estimated to be 7,650 rupees per person per year(Ministry of Fi-
nance, 2009).
13The estimate was taken from row and column 2 of table 1 in Burgess and Pande (2005). According to
Kochar (2011) and Burgess and Pande (2005), at the beginning of India’s policy, the annual average of rural
credit was Rs.24,000 million, or 1.5 percent of the total credit disbursement and population in India was
approximately 400 million. And the poverty line was Rs.49 per person per month, which equals Rs.588 per
annum.
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of crop credit disbursement even though they witness smaller growth of bank branches.
However, the point estimates are imprecise, especially of the number of borrower, and
small in magnitude. Therefore, we should not over interpret them. On the other hand,
the trends of the non-crop credit variables are more precisely estimated. Both the number
of borrowers (column 6) and the amount (column 7) of non-crop credit grew slower in a
more than less rural district, a decreasing trend that is consistent with the branch expan-
sion pattern (column 1). However, the magnitudes of the point estimates are also small.
Although there is no comparable estimate from similar studies, it is highly doubted that a
less of only 69 borrowers per million population per year (column 6) in a more, as com-
pared to a less, rural district can generate meaningful difference in welfare between these
two districts on an annual basis. Similarly, the magnitude of the point estimate for the
amount of non-crop credit is very small compared to the poverty line and thus unlikely
to generate additional disposable income that is large enough to change the life of the
average person. The estimates of credit variables are visualized in Figure 3.7, with each
panel presenting the effect on an outcome. The line is fitted with a slope of β1 estimated
from model (3.5) and the dots are the βτ coefficient estimated from model (3.3).
Overall, the analysis in this part suggests that there is a lack of expansion of agricul-
tural credit in terms of number of borrowers. Although there is evidence of expansion of
the amount of non-crop credit in less rural districts, a pattern that is consistent with the
branch expansion pattern, the magnitudes of the point estimates are rather small and it is
doubtful that it can pass down a transformative effect on poverty.
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Note: The dots refer to the point estimates of the βτ from model (3.3). The blue lines are fitted with a slope
equal to the estimate of β1 of model (3.5).
Figure 3.7: Rural Population Share and Agricultural Credit
Finally, I test whether there is policy impact on poverty, i.e., whether the imposition
of the reform causes a trend break in the correlations between rural population share and
poverty in a district. This is achieved by estimating model (3.4) with its left-hand-side
variable replaced by “Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPIdt)”, a poverty measurement
with a range between 0 and 1. A higher value of MPI indicates severer poverty. I am
interested in testing the whether β1 is significantly different from zero.
The results are reported in column (8) of Table 3.5. Due to the lack of data before
2004, I use 2004 as the reference year and restrict the intercept change at the kink to
be zero (i.e., λ1 = 0). The insignificant β0 and β0 + β1 suggest that the poverty in a
more than less rural district evolved indistinguishably in both before and after the reform,
suggesting that there is a lack of impact on poverty. Although the negative point estimates
of β1 indicates that the policy benefits the more rural districts by slowing their poverty
aggravation, its magnitude is rather small as compared to the average MPI of 2004 (0.372)
and therefore lacks economic significance. The estimate in column (8) is visualized in
Figure 3.8. The slopes of the two line sections are the estimates of β0 and β0 + β1 in
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model (3.4) and the dots are the βτ coefficients estimated from model (3.3).
m
pi
poverty
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
year
be
ta
Note: The dots refer to the point estimates of the βτ from model (3.3). The blue lines are fitted based
on the estimates of model (3.4), restricting the intercept change at the kink to be zero. The slopes of the
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Figure 3.8: Rural Population Share and Poverty
3.7 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to test whether rural branch expansion was suc-
cessful in enhancing financial access and reducing poverty in Pakistan. The widespread
use of these programs, the mixed opinions on them and the lack of previous evaluation
make this an issue of considerable interest. I show that the rural expansion in Pakistan
has failed in achieving its objectives.
In 2004, Pakistan initiated a reform on its “Branch Expansion Policy” which coersed
banks with a branch network size no less than 100 branches to open 20% of new branches
in “Rural and Underserved Areas (RUA)”. And in 2007, this reform was rolled out to all
banks regardless of their branch network sizes. I find that banks have complied with the
reform by discontinuously increasing the share of new branches opened in RUA locations
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to exactly 20% when they became subjected to the reform. This resulted a faster growth
of the stock of RUA branches in 2004 and a further acceleration in 2007. By 2012, the
stock of branches in RUA locations has expanded to 2191 from 1610 branches in 2000.
However, I find that the RUA branches opened after the reform were in locations that are
closer to urban centers and are more likely to have another branch within 5 kilometers
radius than those opened before the reform. The reform, therefore, failed to reach out
to unbanked rural population, and the banked rural population share has stagnated at
57 percent. I conduct a counterfactual analysis and reveal that the fraction of banked
rural population could have reached to 70 to 72 percent by 2012 had the banks chosen
locations with higher rural market potential (i.e., higher rural population per branch) for
those branches reserved by the quota.
Consistent with this pattern, on an aggregate level, I find that the number of RUA
branches in a more (e.g., “Lower Dir” whose rural population share equals almost 1) and
less rural district (e.g., “Karachi” whose rural population share equals almost 0) grew
indistinguishably until 2007 when the growth rate in a more rural district was surpassed
by the less rural one by 0.86 branches per million persons per year. This accounts for an
accumulative difference of 5.16 RUA branches per million persons between a more and
less rural district by 2012, a value that is 66% of the average RUA network size in 2000.
Although the more rural districts witnessed a smaller growth in the number of RUA
branches, I do not find that they experienced a meaningfully different pattern of agri-
cultural credit expansion from the less rural districts. The absence of agricultural credit
expansion is also reflected in the previous finding that the rural population covered by
the branch network has stayed stagnant even after the reform. Finally, I do not find that
the poverty aggravated distinctively among districts with different degree of urbanization,
suggesting a lack of impact on poverty reduction. This finding is consistent with Burgess
and Pande (2005) who shows that credit disbursement expansion plays an important role
in attacking rural poverty.
Taken together, my findings have shown that the rural expansion policy has failed to
enhance the banking sector’s rural outreach and reduce poverty. They demonstrate the
need for more carefully designed government interventions for improving financial ac-
cess than Pakistan’s arguably naı¨ve bank branch expansion policy. Although it is of great
interest to investigate the rural branch expansion policy’s effects on other sectors, espe-
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cially the distortion in the profitability of the banking sector itself, severe data restrictions
at the moment has post great challenges. Nevertheless, answering these questions remains
an important task for future research.
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Appendix
3.A Robustness of the Trend Break Model
Using the simple trend break model (3.1) to identify the effect on BNROt relies on the
change in growth pattern of BNROt . Although it is descriptive, it is capable of capturing
the policy’s effects on BNROt because the confounders that affect the growth pattern are
fairly limited. A valid confounder should only affect through the change in the size or
location of the RUA network or the population distribution. These potential confounders
include the closing and shifting of branches and population migration, however, they are
unlikely to pose major threat to my identification strategy. To start with, in order to
reduce the cost posed by the policy distortion, it can be expected that the banks substitute
the already existed branches located in more remote locations with the new branches to
be open in less remote locations. However, it has to be noticed that the regulation for
branch closing and shifting remained strict after the reform. To close a branch, the bank
has to make sure the closing of a branch would not leave the location unbanked. Between
2000 and 2012, only 66 branches have been closed (in comparison, 690 RUA branches
have been opened during the same period) but more importantly, none of these closings
happened in unbanked locations, suggesting that the bias of branch closing is limited. In
terms of shifting, the banks are only permitted to shift their branch within the locality
boundary (i.e., it is not allowed to shift a branch to another village/town/city). Given that
my analysis is at location level (i.e., I do not consider variation within a village/town/city),
the shifting would not affect my result to a meaningful extent.
Regarding migration, my result would be underestimated if there were major migra-
tions to RUA locations after the reform. An ideal approach to account for its influence
would be to use yearly population raster data, which, unfortunately is not available as the
two most recent censuses were conducted in 1998 and 2017 respectively. Nevertheless, I
find that the fraction of population residing in the rural areas (calibrated using 1998 cen-
sus) has stayed relatively constant, if not decreasing, from 1998 to 2017, meaning that
the growth acceleration of BNROt in 2003 and 2006 estimated in column (2) of Table
3.3 is not underestimated. If there is any bias, it is overestimated, which lends additional
support my claim, suggesting that the policy failure is even more severe when accounting
78
for population migration.
3.B Mapping Out the Rural Population
This section explains the calibration process for mapping out the rural population, which
forms the basis for the calculation of branch network’s rural outreach, BNRO.
Figure 3.10 plots the population density at 1 kilometer by 1 kilometer resolution es-
timated by the ”Global Human Settlement (GHS)” database based on the 1998 Pakistan
Population Census. The darker the color, the more densely populated. However, this map
does tell us the borders between rural and urban regions. The task of this section is to
draw these borders.
According to the 1998 census, urban regions refer to localities that are either metropoli-
tan corporation, municipal corporation, municipal committee or cantonment at the time
of the census. Unfortunately, a complete list of these urban localities and their boundaries
are not available to the public. Nevertheless, it is well documented that the urban localities
are much more densely populated than the rural (Ali, 2013). This can also be confirmed
by Figure 3.9, where I collect the district-level statistics from the 1998 population census
and plot each district’s population density against its rural population share. Each dot rep-
resents an individual district and the size of the dot indicates the population size. A larger
population density is clearly correlated with a smaller rural population share. In another
word, a larger population density predicts a larger urban population share. Therefore, I
resort to approximating the urban-rural border within a district by searching for a grid-
level population density threshold which results in a district-aggregate rural population
share that is closest to the value reported in the population census.
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Figure 3.9: Correlation Between Urban Population Share and Population Density
Calibrartion Procedure
The population raster data is composed by 1 kilometer by 1 kilometer sqaure grids.
A grid is defined as an rural grid if its population density is smaller than the optimal
threshold. Precisely,
ruralid =
1, if popid < cuto f f
∗
d
0,Otherwise
where popid is the population size in cell i of district d. cuto f f ∗d is the optimal population
density threshold calibrated to fit the rural population share of district d according to the
census (RSCensusd). The cuto f f ∗d is obtained by solving the following minimization
problem,
cuto f f ∗d = arg minxLd(x)
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where the loss function of district d, i.e., Ld(x), is defined as,
Ld(x) = (RSCensusd−
Nd
∑
i=1
popid ∗D{popid < x}/
Nd
∑
i=1
popid)2
where D{.} is a Boolean function that equals 1 if the expression within the braces is
true. Intuitively, Ld(x) measures the degree of difference between the census reported and
calibrated (with a threshold of x) rural share of district d. Notice that although popid is
real number, the Nd are finite numbers (i.e., the number of grids in a district is finite on
the map). Therefore there is no guarantee of zero loss at the optimum.
Calibration Results
The calibration outcome is presented in Table 3.6, which summarizes the loss value
at the optimal thresholds. The average loss value at the optimal thresholds is 0.0004,
suggesting that the calibrated rural share differ by 0.02 (i.e.,
√
0.0004) on average from
the one reported in the census. However, notice the distribution of the optimal loss values
is highly right-skewed, this indicates that most of the districts have almost perfect fit (loss
value equals to zero and one tenth the average at the 50th and 75th quantile, respectively).
Table 3.6: Calibrated Result: Loss at the Optimal Threshold
N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
L∗d 131 0.0004 0.002 0.000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00004 0.017
cuto f f ∗d 131 11,841 15,018 0 2,720 6,785 15,829 99,506
Under this calibration, the rural grids are identified. The calibrated aggregate rural
population share (61.9%) fits the census (64.5%) quite well. In the following figure, I plot
the ruralid (i.e., the rural cells) which forms the base for identifying the rural locations in
the following section.
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Figure 3.10: Population Distribution in 1998
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Note: The areas in black indicate the rural region identified by the calibration process. The areas in white
refer to urban region.
Figure 3.11: Urban-Rural Decomposition
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CHAPTER 4
School Grants and Education
Outcomes: The Impacts of the
Non-Salary Budget Reform in Punjab
Pakistan
*Joint work with Kafeel Sarwar
Abstract Whether increasing school funding is effective in improving education quan-
tity and quality is critical to the education policymakers. In this paper, we analyze the
impacts of a decentralized school grant program in Punjab Pakistan, the “Non-salary Bud-
get (NSB)” reform. Under this reform, each public school received about ten times the
amount of grant from government prior to the reform. To identify the effects of the re-
form, we explore the spatial and temporal variation of the policy rollout. We find that the
reform has significantly improved the school infrastructures condition. However, we do
not find any discernible effects on student enrollment, attendance rate or test score in the
short to medium run.
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4.1 Introduction
Education has long been viewed as an important determinant of economic well-being.
From the theoretical perspective, education promotes economic growth by improving
human capital, increasing innovative capacity of the economy and facilitating diffusion
of knowledge that is needed to implement the innovative technologies (Hanushek and
Wo¨ßmann, 2010). The empirical literature has also established a positive correlation be-
tween better education (quantity and quality) and better socioeconomic outcomes, e.g.,
health (Strauss and Thomas 1995, Schultz 1997, Schultz 2002). Sen (2001) has regarded
education itself as an intrinsic good. The development policymakers also show their in-
terest in education, and they know how much education is crucial for the process of eco-
nomic development. For example, the United Nation’s “Sustainable Development Goals”
call for quality education for all by 2030.1
These arguments have provided justifications for widespread education interventions
implemented in the hope of improving education quantity (i.e., student enrollment and
attendance) and quality (i.e., learning outcomes like test score). Two broad categories
of interventions based on, namely human capital and physical input have been brought
to test in the literature. Human capital based intervention aims to improve human cap-
ital in the education sector through pedagogy innovation (Duflo et al. 2011, Chen et al.
2017, Naik et al. 2020), teacher’s accountability (Duflo et al. 2011, Duflo et al. 2012, Mu-
ralidharan and Sundararaman 2011, Mbiti 2016), students’ tracking (Duflo et al. 2011)
and school governance (Banerjee et al. 2010, Pradhan and de Ree 2014). This method has
generally yielded positive effects on students’ test scores and attendance. On the contrary,
physical inputs based method seeks to improve education quantity and quality by easing
the constraints on physical resources. These resources could be textbooks (Glewwe et al.
2009, Fro¨lich and Michaelowa 2011), flipchart (Glewwe et al. 2004), radio (Pridmore and
Jere, 2011), computer assistance (Banerjee et al. 2007, Cristia et al. 2017, Kremer et al.
2013), library (Borkum et al. 2012), school buildings (Newman et al. 2002), sanitation
(Adukia 2017), etc. However, a consensus has emerged from these studies that investing
in physical inputs does not have any discernible impact.2
1The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 4 aims at “ensure inclusive and equitable quality
education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”. For more details on targets and facts see:
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/education/
2Multiple review papers show that pedagogical interventions (Kremer et al. 2013, Conn 2014), the
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A specific constraint that may limit the effectiveness of physical inputs on improving
education outcomes is the centralized provision of these inputs. Four issues arise due to
the centralized provision of inputs. First, there are often mismatch between the demand
at the local level and the provision determined at the national level regarding the school
resources. Decision-makers at the local level have a better understanding of the schools’
needs than those at the national level. Therefore, they are in a better position to identify
schools’ deficiencies and to use the resources efficiently (Carneiro et al. 2015, Hanushek
and Woessmann 2011). For example, in Kenya, Glewwe et al. (2009) do not find any ef-
fect of the textbook on students’ test scores because the textbooks provided to the schools
are too complicated for the students and teachers. Second, centralized provision is more
prone to delivery failure. The information asymmetry between the central decision-maker
and the local implementation administrator appears to be more severe than in a decentral-
ized scenario. In Sierra Leone, Sabarwal et al. (2014) show that the centralized provision
of textbooks does not have any impact on students’ test scores. The reason is that most
of the books have been kept in the schools’ storage room, failing to reach the students.
Third, political pressure to initiate visible education policies may also lead education sys-
tems to invest in less effective inputs (Mbiti, 2016). For example, a politician may choose
to give each classroom a computer not because it is an effective way to improve education
outcomes. Instead, it is due to the fact that it is more visible to show the existence of
computers as an achievement to the voters. Finally, complementarities among multiple
inputs may limit the effectiveness of a single input (Mbiti et al., 2019). For example,
giving a tablet to each school without training the teachers to incorporate the tablet into
their teaching would not be likely to affect the students’ learning.
One potential way to avoid these issues and improve efficiency is to provide uncon-
ditional cash grants and devolves the financial decision-making to the school councils,
i.e., decentralized school grants.3 It seeks to increase efficiency by making financial de-
cisions more transparent to communities, reducing corruption and incentivising localised
investment in high quality teachers and materials (Carr-Hill et al., 2018). However, it
computer uses and technology (McEwan 2015), and learning material (Krishnaratne et al. 2013) are the
effective ways to improve the students’ learning outcomes. Above mentioned reviews generally believe that
input-based policies are mostly unsuccessful in increasing students’ achievements.
3The school council is a school-based management committee that consists of teachers, parents and
notable local members. Providing decentralized school grants has emerged as a part of relatively recent
practices for educational decentralization. These practices focus on devolving the decision making con-
cerning the curricula, finance, management and teachers (Bruns et al. 2011, Slater 2013)
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is debated that, decentralized school grant does not necessarily bring efficiency gains
because the school councils do not necessarily possess sufficient capacity in making com-
plex decisions at the local level. Although the allocation of school grants is associated
most strongly with the devolution of financial decision-making (e.g., decisions about how
resources should be allocated within a school), depending on the nature of the needs
identified at school level, the allocation of school grants might also touch on managerial
decision-making (e.g., the recruitment and monitoring of teacher performance) or educa-
tional decision-making (e.g., decisions related to improving the articulation of a school’s
curriculum) (Carr-Hill et al., 2018). Therefore, when implemented in contexts with a lack
of decision-making capacity, decentralized school grants may result in inefficient and in-
effective use of resources (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011).
In this study, we address two questions. First, does providing decentralized school
grants improve the education quantity and quality? Second, does this decentralized grant
have any impact on human capital (measured by teacher’s attendance rate) and school’s
physical infrastructure? Precisely, we study the impacts of the “non-salary budget (NSB)”
reform in Punjab-Pakistan. Each public school in Punjab provides education for 1st to 5st
graders. Before NSB reform, public schools in Punjab received Rs. 20,000 (approxi-
mately 200 USD in 2013) per annum, and an annual addition of Rs. 20,000 if the schools
offer education beyond the 5st grade.4 This fixed grant has proven to be extremely insuf-
ficient even for the basic school maintenance. A rough estimate of the annual recurrent
expenditure of a school is Rs. 70,000.5 The underfunding for the non-salary expenditure
has persistently hindered public schools’ ability to attract and retain students.
Against this backdrop, the Punjab government implemented the NSB reform in 2013.
The NSB reform alters the funding allocation rule from a fixed to a need-based rule. The
need-based formula includes indicators such as school level, student enrollment, furniture
deficiency and building condition. Under this need-based rule, the average annual non-
salary budget per school amounts to Rs. 220,000, which is about ten times the amount
received under the erstwhile fixed allocation rule. The NSB reform was rolled out in three
phases to cover the whole province. In 2013, nine districts were selected for phase one.
In 2014, additional nine districts were added in phase two. Since 2015, the NSB reform
4Primary: grade 1-5. Middle: grade 6-8, High: grade 9-10 and Secondary High: grade 11-12.
5This estimation is based on informal interviews with several school headteachers and members of
teacher unions across Punjab.
88
was extended to the whole Punjab province. The reform’s staggered roll-out schedule
has created temporal and geographical variations in policy treatment which we exploit to
estimate the reform’s impacts.
We combine data from various sources. First, we collect schools’ financial accounts
and infrastructure conditions from the “Annual School Census (ASC)” administered by
the school and education department of Punjab (SED). The ASC is also used by the offi-
cials to calculate the school’s NSB entitlements under the new rule. Second, we collect the
test scores of grade five students, the terminal grade of primary school, from the Punjab
Examination Commission (PEC), which is the organization for conducting standardized
exams for students of Punjab province. Third, we use English reading and mathematical
ability scores of children of age 5 to 16 from the “Annual Status of Education Report
Pakistan (ASER)” as an alternative measure of learning outcomes. Fourth, we measure
the enrollment rate by the share of children of age between 5 and 16 who are currently en-
rolled in a school using the “Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Punjab (MICS-Punjab)”,
a UNICEF-administered household survey. Finally, we obtain student’s and teacher’s
attendance from Punjab Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU), a government de-
partment that administrates monthly attendance surveys at the school level.
We report four sets of results. First, regarding school’s financial account, the NSB
reform has significantly increased school’s annual income and expenditure by Rs. 180,000
and Rs. 135,000, respectively. Second, we find that the reform has significantly improved
the conditions of school infrastructures by 0.045 standard deviations. This effect is driven
by the improvements in the existing infrastructures, e.g., the fraction of functional toilets,
complete boundary wall and safe school building. In terms of human capital, we find that
teacher’s attendance rate has increased slightly by 0.9 percentage points, a value that is
only 1% of the average at the baseline. Third, we do not find any effect on education
quantity as measured by student’s attendance rate and the enrollment rate among children
of age 5 to 16. Fourth, in terms of education quality, we do not find any impacts on
students’ numeracy and literacy test scores and ability scores.
This paper contributes to the debate about the effectiveness of decentralized school
grants on improving the education outcomes in developing countries. The empirical ev-
idence is still limited and mostly based on small scale RCTs. Nevertheless, this limited
empirical literature has suggested that decentralized school grants’ impacts on education
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outcomes are only moderate and its effectiveness is highly contextual. Some lessons can
be drawn from these studies. These include the following.
First, local decision-makers should be supported to build sufficient capacity in un-
derstanding school-based management and making informed spending decisions that are
likely to improve education outcomes. Blimpo et al. (2015) conduct an RCT in the Gam-
bia to study the complementarity between school grant and training for the school man-
agement committee. They find strong complementarity between the two treatments. Pro-
viding schools with grants alone does not have any impacts. Studying a school grant
program that encourages parental participation in school management in Nigeria, Beasley
and Huillery (2017) show that although the program is capable of improving parental
participation, it fails to delivery impact on students’ educational outcomes because the
parents lack the capacity to make effective decisions in school management.
Second, the effectiveness may be hampered by behavioral responses by the stakehold-
ers. Das et al. (2013) study the school block grant programs in India and Zambia using
experimental designs and find that the school grants improve the students’ test scores
only if the grants are unanticipated to the parents. If anticipated, the grants crowd out
parental investment in their children’s education. Competition from the education mar-
ket also affects schools’ decisions. Andrabi et al. (2018) use RCT to study how market
competition affects the effectiveness of school grants among private schools in Punjab
Pakistan. They find that while villages with all schools given the block grant (i.e., high
saturated villages) see improvement in student’s test scores, villages with only one school
given the grant (i.e., low saturated villages) see improvement in enrollment. They explain
that, in order to increase profit, private schools in low saturated villages act as monopo-
lists (on the residual demand from the untreated schools) and bring in additional students
by increasing infrastructures investments, while schools in high saturated villages would
trigger the price war if they do the same because of the lack of monopolistic power. There-
fore, schools in the high saturated village resort to improving test scores (in order to raise
tuition and profit).
Third, spending on improving teaching human capital seems to be promising. Carneiro
et al. (2019) shows that a school grant program in Senegal improves the test scores of the
second graders, especially in schools that spent on human resources training, rather than
on the acquisition of school materials (e.g., textbooks). Consistent with this finding, the
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impacts of the Nigeria program as studied by Beasley and Huillery (2017) is mainly cap-
tured by schools where teachers have benefited from the spending.
To this strand of literature, our study’s contribution is three-fold. First, we add the
evidence to the limited and recent empirical literature on the effectiveness of decentral-
ized school grants on improving education outcomes in the context of Punjab-Pakistan’s
“NSB” reform, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been evaluated erstwhile.
Second, rather than in the context of an experimental setting, we study a real large-scale
policy, which is more likely to capture the real-world effect. Third, this study sheds light
on Punjab-Pakistan’s progress on achieving the “Sustainable Devlopment Goal (SDG)”
which set multiple education-related targets: equal access, gender equity, equitable qual-
ity education, conducive learning environments and adequacy of trained teachers, all of
which are related to our results.
A major limitation of this paper is the short-run nature of the findings because our
identification strategy relies on the variation in treatment timing across the three reform
phases which differ only by one to two years. Long-run analysis is impossible as the
policy has covered the whole province within a time span of two years. Therefore, it
is possible that different results would emerged had the reform allowed longer duration
of each phase, especially for education quality which takes longer time to improve than
school infrastructure. However, the results presented here are still useful. The richness of
the data on school inputs gives some insights into the decisions of spending.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: section 4.2 introduces the institutional
background and the NSB reform. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 discusses the
identification strategy. Section 4.5 presents the main results. In section 4.6, we conduct
some robustness checks. Finally, section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Background and the Non-salary Budget
Reform
Insufficient funding for education has been a critical problem for achieving the goal of
providing quality education for all in Pakistan. Twenty-five million children are still out
of school in Pakistan, of which nine million are in Punjab, Pakistan’s largest province
(Alif Ailaan, 2014a). Education spending in Pakistan is stagnant at 2 percent of GDP
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in the past two decades.6 This low level of education funding is falling short of the
international benchmark, 4%. More severely, the share of the non-salary budget in the
total education budget is only 12%. In Punjab, this share stands at a mere 3%, while the
salary and developmental education budget make up 86% and 11%, respectively (I-SAPS,
2015).
Public schools’ non-salary expenditure is funded by two sources, provincial govern-
ment and parents. Prior to the NSB reform, an average public school received a fixed
grant of Rs. 20,000 or 40,000 per annum from government depending on the school level,
and approximately Rs. 24,000 per annum from parental contribution (Rs. 20 per student
per month). The funding for the non-salary expenditure is extremely insufficient for any
school to maintain its facilities. A rough estimate of annual recurrent expenditure is Rs.
70,000 (excluding building maintenance). According to our interviews with the headmas-
ters and teachers of the public schools, some schools manage to cover the deficit in NSB
by selling trees from the schoolyard and asking for donations in cash or in kind from
local villagers. In some cases, the headmasters or teachers use their personal relations to
approach the member of the Provincial and National assembly to seek discretional funds
for schools. Occassionally, teachers advance the expenditure from their own pockets, and
reimburse themselves from the next round of funding. There are even cases where schools
impose fine on the students, if they are late from school or not wearing school uniform.
Against this backdrop, the school education department, with the support of the World
Bank, had designed and implemented a need-based non-salary expenditure funding pol-
icy, i.e., the non-salary budget reform, starting in the financial year (FY) 2013/14. Under
this reform, the annual amount of NSB is no longer fixed but based on a set of school-need
indicators, which include school level, student enrollment, furniture deficiency and in-
frastructures condition. An average public school receives an annual grant of Rs. 220,000
which is paid in 4 installments. School councils are made accountable and responsible for
planning, managing and administrating the NSB grant. The grant can be used to cover a
wide arrange of non-salary expenditures, e.g., construction, stationery, furniture, teaching
materials, provision of electricity and water and sports goods.
The reform was rolled out in three phases and planned to cover the whole province
in three years. Figure 4.1 visualizes the geographical coverage of this staggered roll-out
6This figure is extracted from various waves of the Pakistan Economic Survey by the Ministry of Finance
of Pakistan. http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey archieve.html
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schedule. The province of Punjab is divided into nine divisions, with each division con-
sisting of 3 to 6 districts. In total, there are 36 districts in Punjab. The selection of districts
into different phases is stratified at the division level. In the first phase in FY2013/14, one
district per division was selected (i.e., nine districts in total). In the second phase in
FY2014/15, an additional district per division was selected (i.e., 18 districts in treatment
including phase one districts). Finally, in the third phase in FY2015/16, the program was
rolled out to all 36 districts.7
 
 
 
Phase 1                     Phase 2                  Phase 3 
FY2013/14               FY2014/15             FY2015/16                    
 
Note: The left panel shows the map of Punjab-Pakistan which consists of 36 districts whose boundaries
are drawn in white. These 36 districts make up nine divisions that are separated by colors. The right panel
shows the “NSB” reform’s coverage across districts and phases.
Figure 4.1: Non-salary Budget Reform’s Rollout
The selection of districts into different phases was determined by the reform commit-
tee that was led by three members. While the exact selection rules for pilot districts were
not documented, the committee disclosed to us that the rules were not systematic and the
selection was rather based on overall impressions of the districts’ ability of information
updating, as the committee relied on this ability to monitor the reform’s implementation
and progress. The information was delivered by the districts’ education officers (EO). A
typical EO is made responsible for several public schools. Their responsibilities include
conducting school surveys, maintaining administrative records of schools, implementing
education initiatives in the field and ensuring delivery of quality education. We show the
7Nine districts of phase 1: Chakwal, Chiniot, Khanewal, Muzaffargarh, Nankana Sahib, Okara, Rahim
Yar Khan, Sargodha and Sialkot. Additional nine districts of phase 2: Attock, Bahawalpur, Gujranwala,
Kasur, Khushab, Layyah, Pakpattan, Toba Tek Singh and Vehari
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robustness of our main results to the addition of a proxy for the EO’s effort in the section
of robustness check.
4.3 Data
We use both administrative and household survey data for our analysis. We compile
a school-year panel using administrative data from three sources. First, we collect the
information on school infrastructure, facilities and financial accounts from the “Annual
School Census (ASC)”, which is conducted in September annually by the School and
Education Department (SED). The ASC is also used by the reform committee to calculate
the schools’ NSB entitlement. Secondly, we obtain the teacher’s and student’s attendance
rate from the Program Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU). In order to collect
this information, PMIU hires approximately 900 Monitoring and Evaluation Assistants
(MEAs) to administer the monthly survey in all public schools in Punjab. The MEAs
are assigned to school clusters in such a way that they are able to visit at least 4 schools
per day. The MEAs’ assignment is rotated every month, which prevents MEAs from
forming personal relationships with the school staff of a particular area. We aggregate the
monthly data to annual level. Lastly, we obtain the standardized test scores of the fifth-
graders who need to pass the test in order to advance to middle school. The test scores are
obtained from the Punjab Examination Commission (PEC), SED’s autonomous body that
administers the standardized exam. The exam is held annually in February and consists
of five subjects, namely Urdu, English, Islamic study, Math and Science. Each subject
requires 40 points (out of 100 points) to pass. We categorize these five subjects into two
categories: numeracy and literacy, where numeracy consists of Math and Science, and
literacy contains the other three subjects. We calculate the category-wise average score
and standardize this average score to a z-score, year by year.
In addition, we compile a district-year panel from two independent household sur-
veys, namely, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS-Punjab) and the Annual Status of
Education Report (ASER-Pakistan). MICS-Punjab is part of the global MICS programme
that was developed by UNICEF in the 1990s as an international multi-purpose household
survey programme to support countries in collecting internationally comparable data on
a wide range of indicators on the situation of children and women. MICS-Punjab is not
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available on an annual basis and we only use the three most recent survey waves (i.e.,
2007, 2011 and 2014) which are cross-sectional household surveys. However, all survey
waves provide a district identifier for each sample household that allows us to build a
district-year panel. For each household, MICS-Punjab records basic information of all
household members, including age and whether the member is currently enrolled in a
school. Following the UNICEF’s criteria, we calculate the enrollment rate of a district as
the share of children of age between 5 and 16 that are currently enrolled in a school. To
measure the children’s learning outcomes from another perspective, we use the ASER-
Pakistan children surveys of the wave of 2013, 2014 and 2015. ASER-Pakistan is con-
ducted in September when the new school year starts. It aims to provide reliable estimates
on the schooling status of children of age between 5 and 16 years residing in Pakistan.
Similar to MICS-Punjab, ASER-Pakistan is a cross-sectional household survey with dis-
trict identifiers that allow us to compile the information to a district-panel. ASER-Pakistan
grades children’s English and mathematical abilities by five levels.8 For our analysis, we
rescale the scores as follows. “English Ability” is graded as 1 if the child can’t read, 2 if
can recognize letters/words or 3 if can read sentences. Similarly, a child’s “Mathematical
Ability” is graded as 1 if s/he has zero knowledge, 2 if can recognize numbers or 3 if can
perform mathematical operations. Under this scale, the higher the score, the higher the
abilities to read English or perform mathematics.
The data structure is presented in Figure 4.2. Our school-year panel consists of six
years of data on an annual frequency. The reform started to roll out in September 2013.
However, according to a third-party evaluation report on the reform implementation, the
grants did not arrive at the schools until the last quarter of 2013 due to the systematic
technical issues at the provincial and district governments (Cambridge Education, 2014).
Therefore, we regard the first two years as the pre-reform. Our district-year panel is
relatively shorter with three years of data from ASER and MICS. The timing of the reform
roll-out determines that we have two years of pre-reform data for enrollment rate and one
for children’s English reading and mathematical abilities.
8English: “Can’t read”, “Recognize capital letters”, “Recognize small letters”, “Can read words” and
“Can read sentences”. Mathematics: “Zero knowledge”, “Recognize numbers 1-9”, “Recognize 10-99”,
“Can perform Subtraction” and “Can perform division”.
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Figure 4.2: Data Structure
The summary statistics of the pre-reform data is presented in Table 4.1. There are
48,310 public schools in our sample, 47% of which are boy’s schools. All public schools
offer education from grade 1 to 5, which is the primary-level education. Among all public
schools, 16% offer additional grade 6 to 8, i.e., middle-level education. Furthermore, 13%
offer teaching at grade 9 to 10, i.e., high-level. In comparison, only 1% public schools
offer additional grade 11 to 12 teaching, which is the secondary-high-level education in
Punjab-Pakistan. Regarding the financial account, an average public school receives ap-
proximately Rs. 32,000 from government and spent Rs. 40,000 in total per year. It should
be noted that the public schools also receive funds from parental contributions and NGOs
whose records are not available for most of the schools and therefore not included in our
analysis. Absence of basic facilities like drinking water, electricity, main gate or toilet
is rare. However, the conditions of the school buildings and boundary wall are relatively
poor, with only 59% of the schools reporting their building conditions to be safe and
87% reporting their boundary walls to be complete. To measure the overall status of the
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infrastructures of a school, we calculate an infrastructures index, which takes the sim-
ple average of the z-scores of all infrastructures variables aforementioned. Intuitively, it
measures how different a school’s infrastructures status is from the average status of all
schools. Similarly, we calculate a sports facilities index to capture the overall sports sup-
plies sufficiency in a school. These supplies include cricket, football, hockey, badminton
and table tennis. Regarding attendance, student’s attendance rate in different levels of
education are quite high. 85% of the registered students in grade 1 to 5 were present
during a MEA’s visit. This value is 88%, 87% and 84% for grade 6-8, 9-10 and 11-12,
respectively. Teacher’s attendance rate in an average public school stands at around 87%.
In terms of the scores of the grade-5 test, which a student needs to pass to advance to the
middle-level education (i.e., grade 6-8), the average raw score of all numeracy subjects
is 41 points which is on the verge of passing. Raw literacy score appears to be higher,
reaching to 50 points. In our analysis, we normalize the scores using the same method
in calculating the infrastructures index. Score normalization is a common practice in as-
sessing the impacts on test scores. The normalized score allows for comparison across
samples, as well as with the results from other studies (Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2016).
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics: Pre-reform
Mean Std.dev Min Max N
School Cross-sectional
Male 0.470 0.500 0 1 48,310
Primary 0.690 0.460 0 1 48,310
Provide education for:
Grade 6-8 (Middle) 0.160 0.370 0 1 48,310
Grade 9-10 (High) 0.130 0.330 0 1 48,310
Grade 11-12 (Secondary High) 0.010 0.110 0 1 48,310
School Panel
School grant received (10,000 Rs.) 3.250 7.490 0 218 82,550
Expenses (10,000 Rs.) 4.130 8.190 0 235 82,550
Building condition is safe 0.590 0.490 0 1 82,550
Boudary wall is complete 0.870 0.340 0 1 75,097
Drink water exists 0.980 0.150 0 1 82,550
Electricity exists 0.820 0.380 0 1 82,550
Main gate exists 0.920 0.280 0 1 82,550
Toilet exists 0.998 0.048 0 1 82,550
Share of functional toilets 0.950 0.180 0 1 82,550
Infrastructures index 0.035 0.390 -3.320 0.450 82,550
Sports Facilities index 0.003 0.600 -0.320 4.460 82,550
Teacher attendance rate 0.870 0.100 0.060 1 96,574
Student attendance rate
Grade 1-5 0.850 0.090 0.040 1 91,678
Grade 6-8 0.880 0.070 0.080 1 26,447
Grade 9-10 0.870 0.090 0.020 1 11,993
Grade 11-12 0.840 0.150 0.210 1 1,025
Grade 5 Standardized Test Score
Numeracy (Raw) 40.949 12.912 0.000 90.638 86,989
Literacy (Raw) 50.044 11.900 0.000 86.167 86,989
Numeracy (Normalized) 0.040 0.990 -3.220 3.800 86,989
Literacy (Normalized) 0.050 0.980 -3.840 3.170 86,989
District Panel
Math. Ability Score 2.389 0.156 1.978 2.634 36
English Ability Score 2.244 0.162 1.812 2.543 36
Enrollment Rate 0.708 0.121 0.390 0.895 71
Note: Numeracy subjects: Mathematics and Science. Literacy subjects: English, Urdu, Islamic religious study. Infrastructures index
is the average of the z-scores of the following variables: Building condition is safe, Boundary wall is complete, Drink water exists,
Electricity exists, Main gate exists, Toilet exists and Share of functional toilets. sports facilities index is the average of the z-scores of
five dummy variables for the existence of the following five respective sports facilities, i.e., cricket, football, hockey, badminton and
table tennis.
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As revealed by the reform committee, the selection into early phases is based on the
districts’ information update ability, rather than purposefully on the districts’ improve-
ment potentials. In order to assure that there is not targeting on the observables, we
conduct a balance test using the baseline data (first year of each variable). Specifically,
we run the following regression model,
ydr = β13 ∗PHASE1d+β23 ∗PHASE2d+ηr+udr (4.1)
β12 = β13−β23
where ydr is the observable in district d and division r at baseline. PHASE1d and PHASE2d
are respectively the dummy variables for the first and second phase assignments of district
d. Since the selection is stratified at the division level, we add the division fixed effects,
ηr. Therefore, β13 captures the baseline difference in observable of the first, relative to
the third, phase districts. Similarly β23 is the difference of the second, relative to the third,
phase districts. The difference between the first and second phase (with the second phase
as reference), β12, is estimated by the difference between β13 and β23.
Running model (4.1) on 14 outcome variables, we report the results of this balance test
in Figure 4.3. Each bar represents an estimate of β . We plot the point estimates of β12,
β13 and β23 along with their 90% confidence interval in the left, middle and right panel,
respectively. There are some statistically significant difference in teacher attendance rate
and infrastructures index. Teacher attendance rate in phase 2 appears to be the lowest and
phase 3’s infrastructures condition is worse than phase 1. However, among the 42 point
estimates, only 3 show up significant and 2 of them are only at the 10% level. Given
the non-experimental setting in this study, we consider the observables are sufficiently
balanced at the baseline, i.e., there are no obvious selection on these observables regarding
the phase assignment.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
In our analysis, we focus on estimating the average intent-to-treat effect (AITT), i.e., the
average effect of becoming subjected to the NSB reform. In doing so, we exploit the
spatial and temporal variations induced by the policy roll-out. Specifically, we use the
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following econometric specification,
ysdt = β ∗TREATEDdt+αs+ γt+usdt (4.2)
where ysdt is the outcome of school s in district d and year t. TREATEDdt is the dummy
variable for district d entering treatment in year t. αs and γt are school and year fixed
effects. β thus captures the average effects of entering the NSB reform. Essentially, this
is a double-differences approach with variation in treatment timing. Effectively, β is a
weighted average of all possible two-group/two-period double-differences estimator in
the data (Goodman-Bacon, 2018). β delivers only the short-run (one to two years) effects
of the reform because the treatment timing across the three phases differs only by one
(between phase-1 and 2, or phase-2 and 3) to two (between phase-1 and 3) years.
This specification controls for the time-variant factors common to all schools, i.e., year
fixed effects, and the school specific time-invariant factors, i.e., school fixed effects. The
confounders of TREATEDdt , if there is any, have to be school-specific time-variant. In
our case, the selection of school/district to enter the early phases could bias the estimate of
β if the selection criteria are based on the schools’/districts’ improvement potential on the
outcomes. However, there are two reasons to reassure us that this selection bias is limited.
First, the reform committee revealed that the selection was based on the districts’ ability
of information updating. As the reform has been planned to eventually cover all districts
in Punjab, the committee did not have any obvious incentive to purposefully select the
better improvers into early phases. Given the capacity constraint, the committee was
more concerned about a smooth implementation process. More specifically, a district was
selected into early phases if the district had a group of education officers (EOs) who are
more responsive to the reform committee. Therefore, the selection bias can be reduced
by controlling for the district’s EOs’ information update ability. We discuss the addition
of this control in our robustness section. Second, the balanced outcomes across phases
at baseline (Figure 4.3) reassures that the committee did not purposefully select on the
districts’ improvement potentials, at least on the observables.
The critical assumption in our identification strategy is that the outcomes in differ-
ent phases would have evolved parallelly had the reform been absent, i.e., “the common
trends” assumption. The data structure allows us to conduct a placebo test for the validity
of this assumption. We demonstrate the placebo test in detail in the robustness section.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 School’s Financial Account
If the policy is expected to have impacts on education outcomes, the grants need be re-
ceived and spent by the schools first. We begin by presenting the results on schools’
financial accounts. As suggestive evidence, we group the schools by the reform phase as-
signments and plot the average amount of grant received and spent in the last 12 months
by phases against the years in Figure 4.4. As shown in the upper panel of the figure,
an average public school received around Rs. 30,000 before the reform. However, the
amount of school grants received by the phase-1 schools in the last 12 months has seen
a discontinuous increase to Rs. 210,000 in September 2014, exactly 12 months after the
phase-1 reform rolled out in September 2013. Similarly, phase-2 and phase-3 schools saw
a similar discontinuous increase in 2015 and 2016 respectively, exactly one year after they
became subjected to the reform. The three staggered discontinuities in the three phases
mimic the staggered roll-out schedule of the reform. We notice that the average amount
of the receipt dropped slightly after schools entered the treatment. There are two reasons
contributing to this drop. First, as we mentioned, the PMIU recalculated the need-based
school grant entitlements on an annual basis. The drop could reflect the decrease in school
needs due to the improvement during the previous year. Second, there are delay issues
in grant disbursement since 2016 (Khattak 2015, DAWN 2018). Although this delay is
not yet fully understood to us at this moment, it has been accounted for by the year fixed
effects in model (4.2) because the decreasing trend is common to all phases. Regard-
ing spending, the lower panel also shows a similar staggered pattern, suggesting that the
schools responsively increased their expenditure. Overall, this is a strong evidence that
the need-based grants have been received and spent by the schools.
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Expenses in the last 12 months
School Grant Received in the last 12 months
2012/09 2013/09 2014/09 2015/09 2016/09 2017/09
10
20
10
20
Year/Month
10
,0
00
 R
s
Phase-1 Phase-2 Phase-3
Note: The results are calculated using school-year panel data. Schools are grouped into three phases based
on the policy phase assignments of the districts where the schools are located. Then for each phase-year,
we calculate the average grant received/expenses.
Figure 4.4: School Grant Received from the Government by Phase and Year
To estimate the average policy effect on the schools’ financial accounts, we run model
(4.2) and the results are presented in Table 4.2. When an average public school becomes
subjected to the NSB reform, it receives Rs. 180,000 more from the government, which is
6 times the amounts before the reform (column 1), and spends Rs. 135,000 more, a value
that is three times the average before the reform (column 2).
Table 4.2: Policy Effects on School’s Financial Account
Grant Received Expenses
(10,000 Rs.) (10,000 Rs.)
(1) (2)
TREATED 18.18∗∗∗ 13.59∗∗∗
(1.85) (1.35)
Observations 278,779 278,779
Note: The dataset is a school-year panel. Standard errors are clustered on the district level. The analysis
covers all 36 districts in Punjab-Pakistan. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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4.5.2 School Inputs
Seeing that the schools have increased their spending, we are interested in understanding
whether the spending has improved the schools’ conditions. The rich data from the ASC
provides us with an opportunity to test a large quantity of outcomes. However, it is con-
sidered problematic to do so for two reasons. First, we will encounter the issue of multiple
hypotheses testing where there is a danger of overinterpreting any single significant result
on a specific infrastructure, especially when there are many possible outcomes without
a single possible causal pathway (Banerjee et al., 2015a). Second, due to the fungibil-
ity of the school grant, heterogeneity in grant uses can make some effects hard to detect
(Banerjee et al., 2015c). Therefore we aggregate the infrastructures outcomes into an in-
frastructures index as a way to capture the effect on overall infrastructures condition and
reduce the danger of overinterpreting. The results are presented in Table 4.3. As shown
in column (1), the overall infrastructures condition indeed witnessed an economically and
statistically significant improvement by 0.045 standard deviations. When looking at the
impacts on the components of the infrastructures index, we see an interesting pattern.
As shown in table 4.4, we find that the NSB does not avail more facilities, i.e., drinking
water, electricity, main gate or toilet (column 1 to 4), but improves the condition of the
existing infrastructures (column 5 to 7). Specifically, the share of functional toilets saw an
increase of 1.5 percentage points. The building condition of the schools is 7.4 percentage
points more likely to be safe, an improvement that is 13% relative to the pre-reform level.
The boundary wall is 1.5 percentage points more likely to be complete, an improvement
amounts to 1.7% of the average before the reform. Similarly, we aggregate the avail-
abilities of various sports facilities into a sports facilities index whose result is shown in
column (2) of table 4.3. We find that policy effect on the overall availablity of sports
facilities is nonexistent in that the point estimate is both statistically and economically
insignificant.
Of course, there are other items, e.g., textbooks, stationery and teaching materials
quantity and quality, on which the schools may have spent the grants. However, we could
not include them in our analysis due to the lack of data. Nevertheless, we project the
improvement on these items to be limited as the improvement on the existing infrastruc-
tures involved construction works that cost a majority of the grant. In fact, Cambridge
Education (2014), a review on the expenditures by public schools in Punjab, reports that
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in the school year of 2013/14, only 2% of the 400 sample schools ever spent the budget on
learning and teaching materials. In comparison, 65% of schools reported ever spending
the budget on school buildings and other infrastructures. Overall, these results are consis-
tent with Kremer (2003) who points out that providing larger grants to schools in Kenya
led school committees to shift spending toward construction from textbooks.
While the reform has sharply increased the school grants for non-salary items, teach-
ers can still indirectly benefit from the non-salary spending, e.g., from the improvement
of the classroom condition. Compared to the school infrastructures and facilities, the in-
formation on human capital is quite limited to us. The only variable available to us to
approximate the human capital quality is the teacher attendance rate. In fact, teacher’s
absenteeism is a major concern in Punjab’s education reform. Punjab has been criticized
by its large share of ghost teachers and multi-grade teaching problems. It is necessary to
keep teacher in the school before teachers can exert effort in improve teaching. Column
(3) of table 4.3 shows that the NSB indeed improves the teacher attendance rate by 0.9
percentage points. However, this magnitude is rather nominal as it makes up only 1% of
the average teacher attendance rate before the reform, or one hour per month from another
perspective.9 The reform may also affect teachers’ effort on improving their pedagogy,
which is in fact a promising way for education outcome improvement (Glewwe and Kre-
mer 2006, Glewwe and Muralidharan 2016). This is especially relevant in the context
of Punjab-Pakistan as the education system is characterized by its low effort of teaching
(Naviwala, 2015). Unfortunately, the lack of data on teachers’ effort prevents us from
investigating further along this direction.
Table 4.3: Program Impacts on School Inputs
Infrastructures Sports Facilities Teacher
Index Index Attendance Rate
(1) (2) (3)
TREATED 0.045∗∗∗ -0.007 0.009∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Observations 261,517 278,779 289,564
Note: Standard errors are clustered on the district level. The analysis covers all 36 districts in Punjab-
Pakistan. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
9Assuming teachers teach 6 hours per school day and 20 school days per month, an increase of 0.9
percentage points in teacher attendance rate is equal to 0.009*6*20 = 1.08 hours per month.
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Table 4.4: Program Impacts on Components of the Infrastructures Index
drink water electricity main gate toilet share of building cond. boundary wall
exists exists exists exists funct. toilets is safe is complete
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TREATED -0.001 0.001 0.008 -0.001 0.015∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.007)
Observations 278,779 278,779 278,779 278,779 274,098 278,779 261,517
Note: Standard errors are clustered on the district level. The analysis covers all 36 districts in Punjab-
Pakistan. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
4.5.3 Education Outcomes
Ultimately, we are interested in the effects on educational outcomes. Specifically, we
examine the effects on education quantity, as measured by enrollment rate and student
attendance rate, and education quality, as measured by the students’ test score and read-
ing/mathematical abilities. The results are presented in table 4.5.
In terms of education quantity, the NSB reform does not improve school enrollment
(column 1). In fact, the effect is quite precisely estimated to be zero in that the point
estimate -0.009 is very small and even the upper bound of its 95% confidence interval is
only 0.018, a value that is 2% of the average enrollment rate before the reform. Regarding
student’s school attendance, the point estimates in column (2) to (5) suggest that the NSB
reform increases the attendance rate of students from various school levels. However, the
magnitudes are only nominal which are approximately 0.7% of the average attendance
rate before the reform, suggesting that the impact on student attendance rate is nonexis-
tent.
Regarding education quality, we do not find any impacts on children’s mathematic
and English reading abilities (column 6 to 7). While the point estimates are negative,
suggesting that the NSB reform may even decrease the mathematic and English reading
scores of children of age between 5 and 16 by 0.026 and 0.021 points, respectively, they
are both statistically and economically insignificant (column 6 and 7). In comparison, the
pre-reform mathematic and English reading scores for an average child are 2.4 and 2.2
points. Similarly, the effects are lacking for the fifth graders’ test scores (column 8 to 9).
Overall, despite the significant increase in spending and the subsequent improvement
in school conditions, we do not find policy impacts on education quantity and quality. This
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is largely consistent with the literature, which shows that improving physical inputs alone
does not have meaningful impacts on education outcomes (see the review by Glewwe
and Muralidharan 2016). One should keep in mind that our results are relatively short-
term, and the lack of more detailed measures of human resources prevents us from a more
comprehensive investigation into the human resources channel. Therefore, we cannot rule
out the possibility of improvements in education outcomes through higher teacher effort
or better school management in the long term.
Table 4.5: Program Impacts on Education Outcomes
Enrollment Student Attendance Ability Test Score
Currently Enr. Primary Middle High H.Sec Math. Eng. Num. Lit.
(Age 5-16) (%) (Gr.1-5) (Gr.6-8) (Gr.9-10) (Gr.11-12) (Age 5-16) (Gr.5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TREATED -0.009 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.026 -0.021 -0.087 -0.059
(0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.042) (0.044) (0.07) (0.07)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
School FE N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
District FE Y N N N N Y Y N N
Data Unit Dist. Sch. Sch. Sch. Sch. Dist. Dist. Sch. Sch.
Observations 107 276,894 84,262 38,423 3,457 107 107 269,526 269,526
Note: Standard errors are clustered on the district level. The analysis covers all 36 districts in Punjab-
Pakistan. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
4.5.4 Interpretation
Taken together, we find that the NSB reform has brought significant improvement in the
conditions of school infrastructures and modest improvement in teacher’s attendance.
However, there is no meaningful impact on education quantity and quality. In light of
Beasley and Huillery (2017), the lack of impacts on education outcomes is likely to be
associated with the lack of capacity among the school council members who are held
accountable for managing the grant. In fact, various reports on the education sector of
Pakistan have consistently shown the lack of capacity of the school councils. A report
on Punjab’s education sector procurements by the Institute of Social and Policy Sciences
(I-SAPS) shows that, school council members from 64% of the public schools in Punjab
are not familiar with the procurement rules and procedures for the school grant that they
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are responsible for, and 91% and 78% of the members report that they need training for
financial management and school improvement planning, respectively (I-SAPS, 2014).
Although it is important to ensure a safe learning environment, it is not an effective
way to improve enrollment and learning (Newman et al. 2002, Kremer 2003). And yet, we
see that school infrastructures are the only outcomes that shows meaningful improvement.
We argue that the reasons are twofold. First, the significant improvement in school infras-
tructure conditions reflects the spending priority of the public schools. Public schools in
Pakistan are often criticized for their poor infrastructure conditions and school security
(Naviwala, 2015). This criticism reached to a peak after school massacre in Peshawar
district in 2014, where seven terrorists entered a public school by scaling the boundary
wall and killed 132 schoolchildren (Sajjad et al., 2015). Improving the school buildings’
conditions is a response to this widespread criticism. Second, although it has been real-
ized in the recent years that a better school does not equal to better education, improving
school infrastructures is still the focus of the education policymakers in Pakistan because
it is regarded as a low hanging fruit for fixing the education crisis (Naviwala, 2019). And
this perception of the policymakers is conveniently adopted and followed by the schools,
especially by those with a school council that lacks capacity. The political connection of
the public school teachers may also facilitate the transfer of this perception. In fact, many
public school teachers have political patronage, and it is not uncommon that they play a
dominant role when making school spending decisions (I-SAPS, 2014).
As it is agreed on in the literature, improving pedagogy is a promising way to improve
education outcomes (Glewwe and Muralidharan 2016, Glewwe and Kremer 2006). While
we find that the NSB reform has increased the teacher attendance rate by 0.9 percentage
point, we doubt that this indicates teachers exert more effort to improve pedagogy. Actu-
ally, the magnitude of the impact is only nominal as it equals only 1 hour per month. If
we take into account the issue of multigrade teaching, which is very common in Punjab, it
is unlikely to see a sizable impact on student’s learning.10 Besides, it is not clear whether
this additional hour per month was dedicated entirely to teaching as the government of-
ten assigns public school teachers to non-teaching duties, e.g., helping with anti-polio
and anti-dengue drives, elections and administering government exams and surveys (An-
drabi et al., 2008). Alif Ailaan (2014b), a research report based on in-depth qualitative
1043 percent of public schools in Pakistan are multigrade (ASER, 2018)
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interviews with 1,250 teachers from more than 600 schools in Pakistan, estimates that
government teachers spend a quarter of the academic year on non-teaching activities. In
fact, public school teachers in Pakistan are notoriously unmotivated in teaching and it has
been associated with an understanding that a child who goes to a public school will not
have a chance in life, in terms of a job or being perceived as an equal (Naviwala, 2019).
Holding teachers accountable is crucial but not easy in Pakistan. As it is mentioned,
public teachers in Pakistan are unionized and are government employees who often have
political patronage. There is no direct accountability relationship between teachers and
parents who pay fees. Therefore, parents and school council do not have the power to fire
a teacher for not delivering quality teaching. In fact, even a minister for education could
not fire a teacher for not showing up to school (Naviwala, 2019). Furthermore, many
teachers also offer private tutoring after school. It has become a norm for students in Pak-
istan to go to after-school tutors. Teachers have an economic incentive to compel students
to sign up for tuition in order to learn material, or teachers may simply have less en-
ergy for teaching in school if they are primarily concerned with their tuition classes (Alif
Ailaan, 2014b). Without a sufficient capacity to manage school grant and hold teachers
accountable, school councils are unlikely to help improving education outcomes by just
receiving a larger amount of grant.
4.6 Robustness Checks
4.6.1 Placebo Test
One compelling way to assess the “common trends” assumption underlying our identi-
fication strategy is to compare the temporal changes before the reform across different
phases, i.e., a “placebo” test. We use two pre-reform years of the panel to conduct this
placebo test. Specifically, our approach is based on the following specification:
ysdt = β13 ∗PHASE1d ∗PPOSTt+β23 ∗PHASE2d ∗PPOSTt (4.3)
+αs+ γt+usdt
β12 = β13−β23
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where PPOSTt is a pseudo-post dummy variable which identifies the latter of the two pre-
reform years. Other variables’ definitions remain unchanged. Therefore, β13 effectively
captures the difference in the trend of phase 1 relative to phase 3. Similar definition is
applied to β23 and β12.
We conduct this placebo test on all outcome variables of our main analysis. We could
not test on the English reading and mathematical ability scores because we only have
one year of pre-reform data on these two variables. The point estimates and their cor-
responding 90% confidence intervals are presented in Figure 4.5, with β12, β13 and β23
being plotted separately in different panels. Overall, we do not find any statistically sig-
nificant difference in the trends across phases before the reform, i.e., the common trends
assumption is satisfied. Furthermore, the point estimates are very precisely estimated as
the confidence intervals are very narrow. This assures us that the zero point estimates are
not a power issue.
4.6.2 Control for District’s Effort on Information Updating
According to the reform committee, a district was selected into an early phase if the
education officers (EOs) in that district were more responding to the education department
in terms of information updating. This could be a confounder to our estimate of the
reform’s impacts if the district’s effort on information updating is correlated with the
improvement in school outcomes. The main channel for the EOs to collect the information
of the schools is to visit the school in person. To control for this potential confounder, we
obtain from the PMIU a school-level cross-sectional dataset which records the number
of visits by EOs during the school year 2012/13, the school year just before the rollout
of the NSB reform. We then calculate the yearly visit frequency for each school and
aggregate to a district average. Then, we rank the districts by frequency of school visits
in a descending order, division by division, i.e., the most visited district in a division is
ranked at the first position of that division. We regard the rank of visit frequency as the
proxy for the district’s effort on information updating. The descriptive statistics of the
visits by EOs are summarized by districts and reported in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6: Education Officers’ School Visits by Districts
District Nr. Visits Ranking Phase District Nr. Visits Ranking Phase
Bahawalpur Division Lahore Division
Bahawalpur 7.09 1 2 Nankana sahib 11.75 1 1
Rahimyar khan 5.8 2 1 Kasur 7.32 2 2
Bahawalnagar 5.6 3 3 Sheikhupura 6.51 3 3
Dera Ghazi Khan Division Lahore 6.06 4 3
Muzaffargarh 8.86 1 1 Multan Division
Dera ghazi khan 8.77 2 3 Khanewal 9.28 1 1
Rajanpur 5.99 3 3 Multan 8.86 2 3
Layyah 5.45 4 2 Vehari 6.22 3 2
Lodhran 3.84 4 3
Faisalabad Division Rawalpindi Division
Chiniot 11.37 1 1 Chakwal 7.19 1 1
Toba tek singh 10.14 2 2 Rawalpindi 6.64 2 3
Jhang 9.8 3 3 Jehlum 5.17 3 3
Faisalabad 6.17 4 3 Attock 3.99 4 2
Gujranwala Division Sargodha Division
Hafizabad 9.74 1 3 Sargodha 13.37 1 1
Mandi bahauddin 9.07 2 3 Khushab 9.01 2 2
Gujrat 8.43 3 3 Mianwali 7.22 3 3
Sialkot 6.83 4 1 Bhakkar 5.57 4 3
Narowal 5.92 5 3 Sahiwal Division
Gujranwala 5.52 6 2 Okara 8.47 1 1
Sahiwal 7.13 2 3
Pakpattan 5.64 3 2
Note: Nr.Visits is the average number of visits by EOs per year per school. Ranking is the ranking of
Nr.Visits within a division.
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We then interact the ranking of visits by EOs with the year dummies and add them to
the specification (4.2). That is, we estimate the following specification,
ysdt = β ∗TREATEDdt+θτ ∗Rankd ∗Dτt +αs+ γt+usdt (4.4)
where Rankd is the within-division rank of the school visit by EOs in district d in year
2012. Dτt are year dummies for year τ with τ = 2013, 2014, ..., 2017. The other vari-
ables’ definitions remain unchanged. The point estimates of the effects, β , and their 90%
confidence intervals are plotted in the left panel of Figure 4.6. For comparison, the re-
sults of the main analysis are plotted in the right panel. As we can see, controlling for
the district’s effort on information updating does not change the main results. In fact, the
point estimates are extremely similar between the two specifications. In this regard, we
conclude that the selection on district’s effort on information updating does not bias our
estimates of the policy impacts.
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4.7 Conclusion
Whether providing decentralized grants to schools is effective in improving education
quantity and quality remains critical for education policymakers. While decentralized
school grant has gathered popularity because it is arguably capable of reducing the mis-
match between centralized provision and local needs, rigorous evaluations are still lim-
ited. We contribute to this limited literature by evaluating a large-scale policy, the “Non-
salary Budget (NSB)” reform in Punjab, Pakistan, which increased the funding for non-
salary expenditure by almost 10 times and made the school councils accountable for grant
management. We find that the NSB reform has significantly increased the income and
expenditure of the public schools in Punjab, resulting in a sizable improvement in the
school infrastructures condition. Although we find that the reform has also improved
teacher attendance rate, the magnitude of the effect is only nominal. Finally, we don’t
find any impact on enrollment rate, student attendance rate or test scores. We interpret
the lack of effects on education outcomes as a result of insufficient capacity among the
school council members. In fact, a report on the procurement in the education sector of
Punjab, I-SAPS (2014), has revealed that the majority of school council members do not
understand the procedure of school procurement. More importantly, the school councils
have limited power to hold teachers accountable for delivering quality education, as teach-
ers in public schools of Pakistan have political patronage. Simply increasing the funding
to schools does not change the lack of accountability relationship between teachers and
school councils. Overall, our findings are consistent with Mbiti et al. (2019) and Beasley
and Huillery (2017) who show that the effectiveness of decentralized school grants de-
pends on the capacity of the local planners who are responsible for grant management.
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